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ABSTRACT
The purpose of the present study was to determine the
nature and degree of relationship between cerebral "hemis
pheric style" and several traditional dimensions of "cogni
tive style."

A large battery of laterality preference,

cognitive style, verbal and nonverbal ability, and selected
additional tests was administered to 97 (52 female, 45 male)
right-handed undergraduate volunteers, with subsequent analy
sis of relationships among the measures by simple correlation,
factor analysis, and multiple regression methods.
Laterality measures included the Zenhausern, VerbalizerVisualizer Questionnaire, and a lateral eye movement observa
tion measure.

Data analyses utilized individual laterality

test scores as well as a composite "laterality index."

Eleven

cognitive style tests were administered, including measures
of field independence, distractibility, complexity, flexibility,
and other dimensions.

Additional tests administered included

measures of verbal and visual synthesizing ability, anxiety,
repression-sensitization, and social desirability.
The main findings of the study were as follows:
(1) intercorrelations of the cognitive style measures were
generally very low, ranging from .00 to -.54; (2) Only one
cognitive style factor reliably emerged, accounting for about
10% of the common cognitive style test variance.

This factor

was called "Open vs. Closed-Mindedness" and was defined
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primarily by Dogmatism, Rigidity, and Ambiguity Tolerance
scores; (3) Maximum multiple prediction of individual and
composite laterality scores from individual cognitive style
tests, cognitive style factor scores, and additional scores
accounted for 11% to 25% of laterality variance; (4) Sex
differences were nonsignificant on all measures with the
following exceptions:

Females performed the Stroop Test

more quickly, were "narrower categorizers" on the Category
Width Scale, and obtained higher trait anxiety scores than
males.
General conclusions drawn were that hemispheric and cog
nitive style, as measured in the present study, are largely
unrelated, and that individuals manifest considerable diver
sity in cognitive style.

The findings caution against over

simplification and overgeneralization in reference to both
hemispheric and cognitive style and their interrelationship.
Low intercorrelations of measures within both domains do call
into question the adequacy of available tests of these con
structs and suggest the need for further test development
based upon current neuropsychological knowledge.

IX

CHAPTER ONE:

INTRODUCTION

In 1950, Adorno and his associates (Adorno, FrenkelBrunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950) published The Authori
tarian Personality.

Also in that year, H. A. Witkin pub

lished a rather brief report on a newly adapted and standard
ized "embedded figures test," which extended previous findings
in the area of individual differences in perception, and which
eventuated in delineation of a perceptual style called field
independence.

And in his 1950 presidential address to the

American Psychological Association (Guilford, 1950), Guilford
presented his structure-of-intellect model of creativity,
which was largely responsible for stimulating a sevenfold
increase in creativity research over the next two decades
(Taylor, 1975).

These and other seemingly unrelated threads

of investigation were to become interwoven approximately a
quarter century later, upon the unlikely framework of find
ings related principally to the brain functioning of intractible epileptics, stroke patients and brain-injured individuals.
In the following chapter, the convergence of these
various lines of research will be traced.

The common denomi

nator of various dimensions of cognitive control, cognitive
style, perceptual style, certain aspects of the creative per
sonality and process, and finally, of differential modes of
brain hemispheric function, will be revealed as an emphasis
upon structural individual differences in human information
1
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processing.

Such structural models stress individual con

sistencies in the mode or manner in which cognitive activities
proceed; i.e., the way in which information is selected,
organized, and processed.

Structural differences are to be

contrasted with individual consistencies in thought content,
such as a particular set of beliefs, attitudes, memories, or
other concepts which may influence attention deployment and
cognition.

The structural view does not deny the relevance

of past learning (leading to such consistencies in thought
content).

However, this view does hold that structural fac

tors will determine in part the kind of content that is pro
cessed and retained by the individual, and moreover, that
these structural factors can be identified and studied inde
pendently of cognitive content variables.
During the past twenty years, neuropsychological
studies have greatly expanded our knowledge of differential
capacities of the two human cerebral hemispheres.

While it

had long been known that the left hemisphere is specialized
for speech and language functions in most individuals, only
relatively recently have two general additional insights
been achieved:

(1) that the right, so-called "minor" hemis

phere appears to be specialized, for certain types of nonver
bal information processing, and (2) that each hemisphere
appears to be specialized, not only for a specific informa
tion mode (e.g., verbal vs. nonverbal), but also in terms of
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processing mode.

The verbal left hemisphere appears to be

particularly adept at any type of task requiring sequential
analysis, temporal discriminations, and motor sequencing-all of which are clearly necessary for but not limited to
linguistic functions.

The processing mode of the right

hemisphere, on the other hand, is of a holistic, configura
tional, nonsequential and perhaps "intuitive" type.

The

right-hemispheric processing mode is well-suited (but again,
not necessarily limited) to the visuo-spatial, melodic, and
emotional tone perception and expression tasks at which it
normally excels.

The emerging neuropsychological view of

functional hemispheric asymmetry stresses differential hemis
pheric processing styles (analytic, linear, sequential vs.
holistic, configurational, and parallel), with logical but
only secondary consideration of the type of information (ver
bal vs. nonverbal) processed most efficiently in these ways.
The neuropsychological concept of "cognitive style" is
thus a fairly recent formulation.

However, other investiga

tors, working within other theoretical contexts, have been
utilizing and investigating the construct of "cognitive
style" for some time.

Operationally, cognitive style has

been measured by a variety of personality, perceptual, and
intellectual tests— all of which purport to measure indivi
dual differences in cognitive style (vs. ability) and struc
ture (vs. content).

The question may then naturally arise:
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What is the nature and degree of relationship between "cogni
tive style" in the neuropsychological sense, and traditional
measures of cognitive style?

While both hemispheres of the

normal brain are presumed to be capable of the differential
functions described above, the neuropsychological notion of
cognitive style suggests that individuals differ in their
relative degree of reliance upon (or preference for) one
hemispheric processing mode or the other.

Might this "hemis

pheric preference," or preferred style of information proces
sing, provide an explanation at the neuropsychological level
of observed stylistic differences in higher-order problem
solving, cognitive-perceptual task performance, and even
some aspects of personality functioning?

Research in this

area is far from the stage of investigating causality in
brain-behavior relationships.

However, a necessary first

step in this direction is exploration of the degree of rela
tionship between the variables of interest, and this is the
major purpose of the present study.
In the chapter to follow, traditional concepts and
measures of cognitive style will be reviewed, with particu
lar emphasis upon those dimensions of cognitive style rele
vant to the present study.

This will be followed by an over

view of the research related to functional brain hemispheric
asyirmetries in both pathological and nonpathological subject
groups.

Neuropsychological findings will then be related to
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the traditional cognitive style literature, with delineation
of the purposes of the present study.

CHAPTER TWO:

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

In this chapter, the general concept, historical origins
and range of referents of the term "cognitive style," will
be presented.

This overview will include discussion of the

issues of cognitive style vs. ability, and of value judgments
as applied to some presumably value-free cognitive style di
mensions.

The overview will be followed by literature sur

veys of the cognitive style dimensions of particular rele
vance to the present study.
Next, the research demonstrating functional asymmetries
of the human brain will be reviewed.

This literature will be

reviewed separately, for those studies involving pathological
(e.g., unilateral brain lesions, commissurotomy or "splitbrain" patients, unilateral focus epileptics, and psychiatric
patients) vs. nonpathological subject groups.

The theoreti

cal rationale for relating these findings in the area of
neuropsychology to the area of cognitive style will follow,
with review of studies which have directly investigated this
possible relationship between differential brain hemispheric
function and individual differences in cognitive style.
Finally, the purposes of the present study will be
described.

The hypothesized interrelationships of the cog

nitive style dimensions included in this study will be stated,
as well as their expected relationships to a composite index
of laterality.
6
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Cognitive Styles:

An Overview

As Nathan Kogan (1973) has observed, "a discussion of
the historical origins of the construct of cognitive style
would be no less than a history of cognitive psychology" (p.
160).

This broad construct has come to subsume such diverse

earlier constructs as "perceptual attitudes," "perceptual
styles," "cognitive attitudes," "cognitive controls," and
"systems principles" (Gardner, Holzman, Klein, Linton &
Spence, 1959; Goldstein & Blackman, 1978).

Most generally

speaking, the notion of cognitive style is based upon the
assumption of cognition as a mediating process between envi
ronmental events and individual response (the S-O-R model).
More specifically, what is common to all definitions of cog
nitive style and its historically precedent constructs is an
emphasis upon the structure as opposed to the content of
thought (Goldstein & Blackman, 1978).
This structural emphasis is apparent in the following
sample of definitions of cognitive style:
. . . the characteristic, self-consistent modes of
functioning which individuals show in their percep
tual and intellectual activities.
(Witkin, Oltman,
Raskin & Karp, 1971, p. 3).
. . . a person's typical modes of perceiving,
remembering, thinking and problem-solving.
(Messick, 1970, p. 188)
. . . consistent individual differences in . . . ways
of organizing and processing information and experience.
(Messick & Associates, 1976, pp. 4-5)
. . . the manner in which an individual receives,
processes, and uses information.
(Ragan, Back,
Stansell, Ausburn, Ausburn, Butler & Huckabay, 1979,
p. 1)
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In addition to an emphasis upon structure (and conse
quently upon consistency and stability), the various defini
tions also emphasize modes, ways, or manner of information
processing— that is, an emphasis upon style as opposed to
ability or proficiency.
Whereas the [ability domain] is concerned with level
of performance--high (or accurate) at one extreme
and low (or inaccurate) at the other--cognitive
styles are purported to deal with the manner in
which individuals acquire, store, retrieve, and
transform information.
(Kogan, 1976, p. 105)
Kogan notes that the theoretical distinction between cogni
tive ability and style is frequently blurred in practice.
Several tests which purport to measure cognitive "style" are
indeed scored according to accuracy vs. inaccuracy of per
formance.

"The term style employed to designate such per

formance may be something of a misnomer" (Kogan, 1973, p.
161).
The appellation "style," in addition to supposedly
connoting a variable independent of ability, also has become
a favored term due to its implication of freedom from value
judgment.

That is, stylistic differences are presumably

differences of type; styles do not imply distinctions of
better or worse, good or bad, adaptive or maladaptive, except
possibly in relation to their specific application.

Yet

again, Kogan (1973) has identified a class of cognitive
styles which, even though not based upon veridicality of
performance, are nevertheless consistently valued more at
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one pole than the other of the dimension.

In practice, it

is a small class of cognitive styles indeed for which matters
of veridicality are irrelevant and to which no value judg
ments are assigned.

"These are the cognitive styles that

are most purely stylistic" (Kogan, 1973, p. 161).

And even

in these cases, interpretive controversy is lively (espe
cially, it seems, when sex differences are involved), creating
the impression of a struggle to impose differential valuing
of the poles even when evidence is lacking to do so (cf.
Bieri, 1969).
Cognitive style research, then, is far from a "valuefree study of cognition," as it is typically characterized.
While current investigators may prefer to adopt a neutral,
nonjudgmental frame of reference (particularly those operating
from a neuropsychological perspective which accepts relative
superiority of each brain hemisphere in the performance of
different functions), a brief consideration of the theoreti
cal frameworks from which traditional tests of cognitive
style were formulated will reveal the reasons for value
biases.

Tests of dogmatism, ambiguity tolerance, and rigidity

evolved from study of the authoritarian personality (Adorno
et al., 1950).

While these tests were attempts to separate

the structural aspects of authoritarianism from any particular
ideology (e.g., fascism and anti-Semitism), the fact that any
such structural component was believed to lead to "antidemo
cratic" attitudes and behavior provides an obvious basis for
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the greater valuing of particular poles of the dimensions.
Also, workers in this area were psychoanalytically oriented,
so that there were theoretical as well as political reasons
to favor the more flexible, tolerant and nondogmatic indivi
dual.

These characteristics were interpreted to be consistent

with a less rigid defensive psychological makeup and relative
freedom from underlying intrapsychic conflict.
Conceptual differentiation and constricted-flexible
control, as well as tolerance for unrealistic experiences,
leveling-sharpening, and focusing, were originally termed
"cognitive controls" and "control principles."

These vari

ables were conceived and studied at the Menninger Foundation
by Gardner and his associates (1959) within an ego-psychoanalytic theoretical framework.

The "control" terminology

reflects the theoretical postulate of ego control; the ego
psychology viewpoint is revealed in the group's emphasis
upon "conflict-free" functions and upon adaptation:
The possibility that "conflict-free" cognitive
functions are idiosyncratically organized in
individuals has not yet been explored by psycho
analysis. It is precisely in this respect that
the concept of cognitive control, with its pro
vision for adaptively adequate yet various modes
of encountering reality, may prove a useful addition
to the theory.
(Gardner et al., 1959, p. 9)
Again, despite the reference to "adaptively adequate yet
various" modes, the underlying theory requires some degree
of differential valuing of the dimensional extremes.

For

example, flexible control is clearly more effective and
adaptive than constricted control (as measured by the degree
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of susceptibility to interference).

Similarly, individuals

low in conceptual differentiation, and those more inclined
toward "leveling" in memory organization, function at a more
primitive developmental level in these areas, according to
the theory.
Field independence (and the related dimensions of
impulsivity-reflection and distractibility) has roots in
developmental, perceptual (Gestalt) and psychoanalytic theory.
From any and all of these orientations, the individual capable
of more precise field articulation and perceptual disembedding
is also theoretically the more advanced and mature.

This view

is supported by evidence which indicates a general increase
in field independence through childhood to young adulthood
(Witkin et al., 1971).

Similarly, cognitive complexity--

whether of the type based upon Kelly's (1955) personal con
structs theory or upon the conceptual systems theory of
Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder (1961),— is regarded as a more
sophisticated state of development than cognitive simplicity.
Although Kogan has remarked that "psychologists concerned
with individual differences very likely score at the complex
end of a complexity vs. simplicity dimension" (1976, p. 98),
it seems likely that complexity is valued more on theoretical
than personal grounds.
The previous discussion reveals that different dimensions
of cognitive styles have been developed from diverse (although
predominantly ego-psychological) theoretical orientations.

12

Thus there exists no commonly accepted, well-defined and
theoretically integrated set of cognitive styles.

The present

review led to identification of over twenty proposed dimen
sions of cognitive style, but major reviewers usually limit
discussion to nine or ten of the most well-known (Goldstein
& Blackman, 1978; Kogan, 1971; Messick, 1970; Ragan et al.,
1979).

Messick's 1976 review, however, included discussion

of eighteen.

Automated computer searches which were com

pleted for a recent review of the cognitive style literature
yielded approximately 3500 citations (Back, Stansell, Ragan,
Ausburn, Ausburn, & Huckabay, 1979).

Certainly this is a

domain of lively research interest, although one remarkably
lacking in integration (cf. Goldstein & Blackman, 1978).
For purposes of the present study, a large number
(ideally, all) of the cognitive style dimensions identified
to date were to be measured.

However, selection of a subset

of representative cognitive style tests was necessitated by
the following factors:

(a) meaningful statistical analysis

imposed some constraints upon the number of measures to be
included, given sample size limitations; (b) available tests
needed to meet some semblance of psychometric soundness and
also needed to be a commonly accepted measure of the dimen
sion in question.

In addition, the relative ease and speed

of administration were considered, as well as nonaversiveness
of the measures.

This last consideration ruled out inclusion

of either of two tests of leveling-sharpening (a variable of
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some interest) because subjects reportedly find both of these
lengthy measures to be "quite monotonous . . . fatiguing and
boring" (Gardner et al., 1959, p. 18).

Given these con

straints, measures were obtained for each subject on eleven
cognitive style dimensions.

These dimensions, and the tests

utilized to measure them, are individually reviewed below.

Dogmatism
Dogmatism, or "closed-mindedness," is "(a) a relatively
closed cognitive organization of beliefs and disbeliefs about
reality, (b) organized around a central set of beliefs about
absolute authority which, in turn,

(c) provides a framework

for patterns of intolerance toward others" (Rokeach, 1954,
p. 195).

Rokeach emphasized the structural aspect of dog

matism, independent of any specific set of beliefs, and thus
differentiated it from other measures of authoritarianism
such as the original Fascism (F) scale of Adorno and his
associates (1950).

This structural emphasis classifies dog

matism as one of the earliest dimensions of cognitive style.
The Rokeach Dogmatism Scale was revised four times.
The final revision, Form E, has 40 items (Rokeach, 1960) and
is most often used in research.

Reliability is generally

high for adult and high school populations, with the Dogma
tism scale achieving a test-retest correlation coefficient
of .55 even over a five-year interval (Vacchiano, Strauss,
& Hochman, 1969).

The scale is apparently unaffected by a
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social desirability response bias (Becker & DiLio, 1967;
Bernhardson, 1967; Wolfer, 1967).
The research literature has been supportive of the
central proposition of Rokeach, that dogmatic persons are
highly resistant to change (Ehrlich & Lee, 1969).

High-

dogmatics (HD) make more errors in learning new word-pairs
than low-dogmatics (LD).

They rate novel musical systems

(e.g., Schonberg as opposed to Brahms) more negatively than
low-dogmatics.

In fact, across three media (painting, music,

and literature), high-dogmatics like popular art significantly
/
more than classical art, and classical art significantly more
than avant-garde (whereas LD subjects appear to like all
esthetics equally well).

In a simulated bargaining game,

regardless of assigned role as union or management represen
tative, high-dogmatics were more resistant to compromise than
LD counterparts, resolved fewer issues and were more likely
to view compromise as defeat.

HD psychiatric patients are

hospitalized longer than LD psychiatric patients, possibly a
consequence of greater resistance to change (Ehrlich & Lee,
1969 ).
Relationships of dogmatism to other personality scales
also indicate relative cognitive inflexibility and change
resistance (Vacchiano et al., 1969).

Higher dogmatism is

associated with lower tolerance, flexibility and security
on the California Psychological Inventory, with higher need
for Succorance and lower needs for Change and Intraception
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on the Edwards Personal Preference Inventory, and with con
formity, restraint and conservatism on the 16PF test.

Addi

tional studies reviewed by Goldstein and Blackman (1978)
showed significant positive correlations of dogmatism to
Intolerance of Ambiguity as measured by both Budner (1962)
and MacDonald (1970), and with the Gough (1975) Rigidity scale.
Dogmatism has been positively related to anxiety and
with various degrees of maladjustment as measured by the
16PF, the Mooney Problem Checklist, the Personal Orientation
Inventory and MMPI Scales, F, K, D, Pt, and Si (Vacchiano et
al., 1969).

Two studies reviewed by Vacchiano and others

showed dogmatism to be associated with sensitizing rather
than repressing defenses on the Repression-Sensitization
scale.

This finding seems to conflict with another study they

reviewed showing high positive correlations of dogmatism with
denial, and high negative correlations with depression, in a
group of 32 males who were gradually losing their sight.
Despite the positive correlations of dogmatism with various
measures of psychopathology, two different studies did not
reveal any relation between school counselor dogmatism and
effectiveness, and dogmatism was positively correlated with
a measure of adaptive regression in a group of creative
artists (Vacchiano et al., 1969).
The review of Goldstein and Blackman (1978) also in
cluded evidence that, as expected, high-dogmatics have been
shown to be more influenced by authority than low-dogmatics
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in a number of studies.

Two studies indicated that dogmatism

affects judgment accuracy as well:

low-dogmatics are able to

judge the dogmatism level of others more accurately than highdogmatics !
Results have been more equivocal in the area of percep
tual correlates of a dogmatic cognitive style (Goldstein &
Blackman, 1978; Vacchiano et al., 1969).

High- and low-dog

matics consistently differ in synthesizing ability (as measured
by Block Designs) but not in analytic ability (as measured by
the Embedded Figures Test).

However, interesting interaction

effects have been noted and summarized by Vacchiano and others
(1969) :
It would appear that the influence of dogmatism (as
a cognitive style) upon perceptual functioning is
limited. The hypothesis that dogmatism and field
dependence are unrelated can be fairly well supported.
Perceptual synthesis, though, seems to be a function
of both dependency and dogmatism. Field-dependentHD groups have the most difficulty with synthesizing;
field-independent-LD's, the least.
(p. 266)
Some of the inconsistent findings noted above may be due
in part to the relatively statistically "impure" nature of
Rokeach's Form E Dogmatism Scale.

Steininger and Lesser

(1974) compared five factor-analytic studies of the Dogmatism
scale and selected the 15 items which consistently emerged (13
items in four or five studies, two items in two studies).

The

resulting 15-item scale correlated from .86 to .92 (£ < .01)
with the original scale's total score for four different sub
ject groups.

Although prior studies have shown high-dogmatics
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to more likely be rightist in political orientation (e.g.,
Karabenick & Wilson, 1969), Steininger and Lesser found dog
matism to be unrelated to conservatism-liberalism, possibly
because they studied nonstudent as well as student groups.

Ambiguity Tolerance and Rigidity
The related dimensions of ambiguity tolerance and cogni
tive rigidity, like dogmatism, emerged from studies of the
authoritarian personality in the late 1940's.

They also were

the result of theoretical efforts to isolate content-inde
pendent, structural individual differences which could account
for prejudice and ethnocentrism, including but not limited to
the phenomenon of fascism.
Based on her studies of ethnic prejudice at the Insti
tute of Child Welfare at the University of California, Else
Frenkel-Brunswik (1949) described the emergence of her con
cept of ambiguity intolerance as follows:
Starting from the observation that some of her sub
jects were able to tolerate emotional ambiguities
better than others, the writer became involved in
the question of whether this attitude of intolerance
of more complex, conflicting, or otherwise open
structures extends beyond the emotional and social
areas to further include perceptual and cognitive
aspects proper.
(p. 114)
Perceptually, Frenkel-Brunswik found ambiguity intolerance
to be related to a "prolonged clinging to the first impres
sion" (p. 129), and cognitively, to difficulty in changing
mental set on both a verbal arithmetic and spatial task.

It

also appeared to be related to a reluctance to think in terms

18

of probabilities in a probability-learning task.
Frenkel-Brunswik, writing from a psychoanalytic orien
tation, believed that "rigidity of attitudes constitutes a
counterbalance to underlying conflicts often verging on chaos"
(p. 132), and she also noted the relevance of parental influ
ence upon the formation of this cognitive style:
Data on the parents of the children in the rigid,
intolerant group reveal that it is their feeling of
social and economic marginality in relation to the
group to which they aspire from which ensues the
desperate clinging to external and rigid rules . . .
It is this rigid adherence to norm which furnishes
the key to an understanding of all the various
avoidances of ambiguities listed in this paper.
(pp. 118-119)
Early attempts to develop an independent scale of ambi
guity tolerance were not successful.

Goldstein and Blackman

(1978) report that a 1958 review of twelve different measures
of ambiguity tolerance was discouraging:

Of the 66 inter

correlations, only seven were significant, and of these seven,
two were in the wrong direction.

A more promising scale, by

Budner (1962), was questioned by MacDonald (1970) on the
basis of its high correlation with another measure of ambi
guity tolerance with a demonstrated internal consistency of
.08.

Budner's scale had, however, shown a degree of validity

by correlating in expected fashion with conventionality,
belief in a divine power, church attendance, dogmatism about
one's religious beliefs, and attitudes with authoritarianism
and expressed attitudes of idealization of and submission to
parents.
Rydell and Rosen (1966) constructed an ambiguity tolerance
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scale with a test-retest reliability of .71 (one month) and
.57 (two months).

MacDonald (1970) increased the length of

the Rydell and Rosen scale from 16 to 20 items, thereby
increasing its split-half reliability in his sample from
.64 to .86; his retest reliability was estimated at .63 (p
< .01) for a six-month interval.

The MacDonald scale of

ambiguity tolerance correlated positively with performance
on a complex Scrambled Words test (r = .33, p < .01), and
negatively with authoritarianism (the F Scale) (r = -.30, p
< .01), Rokeach Dogmatism (r = -.42, p < .01), Gough Rigidity
(r = -.41, p < .01), and church attendance (r = -.24, p <
.01).

It was unrelated to Marlowe-Crowne social desirability

response bias (r = .02).

Goldstein and Blackman (1978) re

gard the MacDonald scale as one of the most promising scales
of ambiguity tolerance, and this was the measure utilized
in the present study.
Rigidity is related to ambiguity tolerance, both theore
tically and empirically, and yet most researchers in the area
take some pains to distinguish them.

Cognitive rigidity is

defined as "a continuation of former behavior patterns when
a change in the situation requires a change in behavior for
more efficient functioning"

(Goldstein & Blackman, 1978, pp.

39-40), whereas intolerance of ambiguity is "the unwarranted
imposition of structure when the situation is unstructured"
(p. 40).

Frenkel-Brunswik (1949) used the terms inter

changeably .
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As in the case of ambiguity tolerance, many early measures
of rigidity were all independent (uncorrelated).

However, the

Gough Rigidity scale (1975) has become commonly accepted as
the criterion measure and presently constitutes the Flexi
bility subscale of the California Psychological Inventory
(Gough, 1975), scored in reverse.

Gough (1975) reports one-

year test-retest reliabilities of .67 and .60 for high school
female and male samples, respectively, and a 7 to 21 day testretest reliability of .49 for male prisoners.

MacDonald

(1970) reports a six-month test-retest reliability of .57 (p
<

.01) for the Gough scale, with a sample of male undergradu

ates.

The validity of the scale is demonstrated by its corre

lations, when scored in the direction of flexibility, of -.48
with staff ratings of "rigidity" of graduate students, -.36
with staff ratings of "rigidity" of medical school seniors,
and -.58 with F-scale (authoritarianism) scores of college
undergraduates (Gough, 1975).

As reported earlier, MacDonald

(1970) reported a correlation of -.41 (p < .01) between Gough
Rigidity and his ambiguity tolerance scale.
Since the MacDonald scale accounts for about 17% of the
variance in Rigidity scores, it is clear that the dimensions
are related but not identical.

Therefore, the Gough Rigidity

scale was included in the present study.

Origence-Intellectance
In 1947, George Welsh constructed a 200-item nonverbal
figure preference test to diagnose psychopathology.

Factor
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analysis revealed a simplicity/symmetry vs. complexity/asymmetry factor.

Subsequently, an expanded (400-item) version

of the test was administered to a sample of 37 artists and
art students, and a group of 150 nonartists.

A 65-item scale

was empirically derived to reliably differentiate the artists,
who tended to prefer the complex items, from nonartists, who
tended to prefer the simple, symmetrical items.

Hence the

scale came to be known as the Barron-Welsh Art Scale (Barron,
1952; Barron & Welsh, 1952).

In attempting to interpret the

results, Barron and Welsh (1 952) suggested that artists may
favor certain principles of composition, or they may resemble
one another in personality.

"Or, again, there may exist some

higher-order determinant of both artistic taste and person
ality style, with both of the lower-order variables having
found expression in these test scores" (p. 201).

Subsequent

studies with the Art Scale tended to support the notion of
complexity-simplicity preference as a personality dimension
(Barron, 1953a, 1953b).

Figural complexity preference con

sistently related positively to personal tempo, verbal
fluency, impulsiveness, expansiveness, and "breakdown of
repression," among other variables and consistently negatively
to rigidity and constriction, impulse control by repression,
politico-economic conservatism, subservience to authority,
ethnocentrism, and social conformity (Barron, 1953a).

Also,

"Independents" as identified in an experiment planned and
conducted by Solomon Asch, were found to prefer the complex Art
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Scale figures to a significantly greater extent than "Yielders"
(p. < .01).

Thus complex figure preference was also shown to

be related to independence of judgment in a peer-pressure
situation (Barron, 1953b) .
Thus from a measure originally designed to be a psycho
diagnostic tool came a scale with ever-increasing generality.
It has continued to be used frequently as a criterion measure
in studies of artistic creativity (see Welsh, 1975, pp. 6069 and 205-227, for an extensive review).

However, even the

early studies described above revealed cognitive dimensions
(and obvious perceptual dimensions, by the nature of the
scale) which may be important structural determinants of
test performance.

Also, the Art Scale is a genuine preference

(vs. ability) test, and as such it is indisputably a measure
of style as opposed to aptitude (cf. Kogan, 1973).
Welsh (1980) developed "Origence" (WOR) and "Intellectance" (WIN) subscales of the full-length, 400-item Welsh
Figure Preference Test (WFPT) to supplant two earlier forms
of the Art Scale.

WOR and WIN were empirically derived from

the WFPT responses of gifted adolescents grouped on the two
dimensions on the basis of personality and vocational
interest test scores.

WOR correlates highly with the

original Art Scale (r = .95), due in part to a substantial
item overlap in the scales.

Low WOR scorers "prefer and are

more at home in an explicit and well-defined world which can
be grasped by the application of objective rules" (Welsh,
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1980, p. 26), while high WOR scores "find congenial an
implicit and open universe which they can structure in their
own subjective way" (p. 26).

Intellectance (WIN) is con

ceptualized as a concrete vs. abstract dimension.

"The

dimensions are conceptually independent and the scales are
statistically uncorrelated but are most useful when scored
and interpreted conjointly" (p. 10).
Welsh characterizes the High Origence-Low Intellectance
individual as a non-conforming, impulsive, extratensive
"imaginative type," often interested in artistic, literary
and esthetic matters.

Conversely, the Low Origence-High

Intellectance scorer is interpreted as a conventional, logi
cal, introversive "intellectual type," who tends to score
higher on standard IQ tests.

Although the model also gener

ates two additional categories in the typology (High OrigenceHigh Intellectance "Intuitive Type" and Low Origence-Low
Intellectance "Industrious Type"), only the first two types
are relevant to the present study.
Welsh (1980) notes that, since the WOR dimension can be
measured by the original Art Scale, earlier studies utilizing
the latter can be interpreted in the framework of his newer,
two-dimensional model.

Thus, the studies reviewed above

which involve the Art Scale showing figural complexity pre
ference to positively correlate with personal tempo, verbal
fluency, impulsivity, and nonrepression, and to negatively
correlate with cognitive rigidity, conservatism, conformity
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and repression are of relevance.

Also, in a small explora

tory study conducted by the writer (Kuchler, Note 1) with
twelve female undergraduates, Barron-Welsh Art Scale scores
were found to correlate positively with cognitive flexibility
(the Gough Rigidity scale scored in reverse; r = .64, £ <
.02) and negatively with Spielberger Trait Anxiety (r = -.58,
£ < .04).

Art Scale scores were unrelated to Spielberger

State Anxiety, before or after administration of a modified,
group Rorschach measure.

On the Rorschach, Art Scale scores

correlated significantly negatively with common detail (D)
responses (r = -.60, £ < .03), with Pure Form Accuracy (F +
%; r = -.63, £ <

.02) and with overall Form Accuracy (X + %;

r = -.78, £ < .002).

Field Independence
Whereas the related cognitive styles of dogmatism,
ambiguity tolerance and rigidity emerged from studies of
authoritarianism, and origence and intellectance have their
roots in creative personality research, field independence
properly refers to a perceptual style first identified in
experimental studies of space orientation and perception of
body position within different visual fields.
Witkin (1950) found that individual differences relating
to how strongly one was affected by the surrounding visual
field in such studies could be generalized to a perceptual
disembedding task.

The underlying stylistic dimension was
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conceived as a narrowly perceptual one and was called field
independence vs. field dependence:
In a field-dependent mode of perceiving, perception
is strongly dominated by the overall organization
of the surrounding field, and parts of the field
are experienced as "fused." In a field-independent
mode of perceiving, parts of the field are ex
perienced as discrete from organized ground.
(Witkin et al., 1971, p. 4)
Extensive subsequent research into the nature and corre
lates of field independent-dependent perceptual styles
(Witkin, Dyk, Faterson, Goodenough, & Karp, 1962) revealed
that the dimension extended further, into the cognitive
domain.

Field-dependent (FD) persons tended to do less

well in solving problems which required isolation of an
essential element from its original context, and its utili
zation in a new and different context.

Hence the perceptual

style of field independence-dependence was conceptually sub
sumed under the broader cognitive style of analytic vs.
global (Witkin et al., 1971).

"What is basically at issue

in this cognitive style is extent of ability to overcome an
embedding context" (Witkin et al., 1971, p. 7).

When further

study revealed a link between analytical and structuring
ability (e.g., ability to impose structure upon inkblots
with resultant percepts that are organized and definite as
opposed to vague and indefinite), the presumed underlying
cognitive style was broadened again in scope and renamed
articulated vs. global (Witkin et al., 1962).
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The articulated-global dimension of cognitive style
was in turn subsumed theoretically under an even broader
psychological dimension called level of psychological
differentiation.

This further generalization was made on

the basis of studies showing the articulated-global cognitive
style to relate to (1) body concept (degree of detail, realis
tic proportion, clarity of sex and role representation in
human figure drawings); (2) sense of separate identity (aware
ness of one's own needs, feelings, and attitudes as opposed
to reliance on external sources for self-definition); and
(3) nature of psychological defenses (specialized, e.g.,
isolation, vs. nonspecialized, e.g., repression or denial)
(Witkin et al., 1962).

"Differentiation refers to the com

plexity of structure of a psychological system" (Witkin et
al., 1971, p. 10).

At any level of differentiation, Witkin

notes, various modes and levels of integration are possible,
and psychological adjustment is more a function of the effec
tiveness of an individual's integration than of differentia
tion per se.
Witkin and Goodenough (1976a, 1976b) recently modified
the theory of psychological differentiation.

Based upon the

vast accumulated literature, they now divide differentiation
into three main subsections:

segregation of psychological .

functions (body concept, defense mechanisms, and control
over impulse expression), segregation of neurophysical
functions (to be discussed below in the section, "Laterality
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and Cognitive Style"), and self-nonself segregation.

Two

subsections of self-nonself segregation are autonomy in
interpersonal relationships and restructuring ability.

While

the influences of psychoanalytic theory, Werner's organismic
theory of development, Lewin's field theory, and Gestalt
principles can all be seen, the cognitive style dimension of
Witkin and his associates presently fits clearly within their
own developed theory of psychological differentiation.
From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the
correct designation of the cognitive style dimension of
Witkin and his associates is either analytic-global or
articulated-global.

However, the field independence-depen

dence terminology has been retained in the present study in
order to most clearly reflect (and emphasize) the perceptual
nature of the criterion measure, the Group Embedded Figures
Test.

Also, the term "analytic" is ambiguous, since it has

been used to describe an unrelated form of conceptualizing
style (Kagan, Moss & Sigel, 1963).

Similarly, "articulation"

is a term easily confused with "conceptual articulation,"
which refers to cognitive complexity in the sense used by
Kelly (1955).
Operationally, field independence (FI) and field de
pendence (FD) have been defined as performance on any of
several accepted (and well-intercorrelated) tests:

The Rod-

and-Frame Test (RFT), the Body Adjustment Test (BAT), the
Hidden Figures Test (HFT), the Embedded Figures Test (EFT),
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and several alternative children's and group forms, including
the Group Embedded Figures Test (GEFT).

Of a variety of

group EFT instruments, the GEFT used in the present study
(achromatic, requiring memory) correlates most highly with
the original, individually administered EFT (r = .84), which
in turn has repeatedly demonstrated reliability in the low
nineties (Jackson, Messick, & Myers, 1964).

Witkin et al.

(1971) report a split-half GEFT reliability of .82 for both
males and females, and a concurrent validity with the parent
EFT of -.82 for males and -.63 for females when the tests
are scored in reverse fashion.
Witkin et al. (1971) vigorously maintain that field
independence is independent of IQ, except for artifactual
correlations with overall IQ produced by actual association
with the relevant "analytic triad" of Picture Completion,
Block Design and Object Assembly of the Wechsler scales.
Nevertheless, significant positive correlations of FI with
verbal ability measures (e.g., Wachtel, 1968; cf. Kogan,
1973) are not rare, and their absence cannot be assumed.
Field independent individuals appear to be less vul
nerable to interference on the Stroop test (Bone & Eysenck,
1972; Messick & Fritzky, 1963) and less impulsive (Massari,
1975; Willoughby, 1967).

Field independence appears un

related to number of categories created in a sorting task
(Gardner et al., 1959) and to dogmatism, rigidity and
ambiguity tolerance (Goldstein & Blackman, 1978; Messick &
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Fritzky, 1963).
Cross-sectional developmental studies indicate that
field independence increases from about age 8 to 15, levels
off in young adulthood, and diminishes in older age, with
the decline beginning in the late 30's (Witkin et al., 1971).
Longitudinal data are also available for individuals between
the ages of 8 and 24, which demonstrates the stability of
subjects' standing on the variable relative to age peers
(r = .48 to .92) (Kogan, 1973).

Kogan (1973) noted that the

studies which indicated more field dependence among the
elderly, and more field dependence of retired elderly rela
tive to employed elderly, were uncontrolled for educational
level, whereas a study which did control for years of educa
tion showed no difference in field independence between
institutionalized vs. noninstitutionalized elderly.

He

suggested that education rather than age constitutes the
major determinant of observed differences between younger
and older groups, and between retired and employed older
persons.
Just as Witkin and his associates may overstate the
case a bit in regard to developmental changes in field inde
pendence and its lack of association with verbal ability, his
definite statements about sex differences (with males con
sistently regarded as more field independent) may require
further qualification over time.

The writer has noted several

studies (Kuchler, Note 2) in which no sex differences in
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field independence, or sex differences favoring females,
have been found.

In their validational study of a variety

of forms of the EFT, Jackson, Messick and Myers (1964) re
ported:
In sharp contrast to a wealth of data indicating
faster and more accurate EFT performance among
males . . . significant sex differences did not
appear in the present sample for any of the EFT's,
not even for the Witkin items administered indi
vidually.
(p. 185)
Using the HFT as the criterion of field independence,
Willoughby (1967) found no sex differences on the dimension.
Kogan (1976) notes that "sex differences in cognitive func
tioning have been steadily declining" (p. 97) and that "the
case for sex differences in cognitive styles and abilities
may have been overstated" (pp. 118-119).

While the actual

current relationship of sex and field independence will only
be determined as the evidence accumulates, the "striking"
sex differences reported by Witkin et al. in the 1950's
cannot be assumed to be evident in current samples of males
and females.
Field independence as traditionally measured is clearly
an ability dimension as opposed to a truly stylistic dimen
sion, as these were distinguished by Kogan (1973).

This

distinction was anticipated by Wachtel (1968), who compared
analytic conceptualizing style as measured by a free sorting
task (Kagan, Moss & Sigel, 1963) with analytic "style" as
measured by the EFT.

Wachtel found no relationship between
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the two.

He noted that the EFT requires the subject to be

analytical and thus analytic capacity is measured, whereas
the sorting task may reflect a genuine stylistic preference.
The extremely field-independent individual has
available to him a highly analytic mode of func
tioning . . . Whether an available mode of func
tioning is utilized almost exclusively or only in
particular situations may itself represent an
important stylistic variable.
(p. 209)
Witkin et al. (1971) also express interest in the fieldindependent individual who always functions in field-indepen
dent fashion and the one who may or may not choose to do so.
They appeal to Werner's (1957) concept of mobility vs.
fixity to account for the difference.
A final issue of importance relevant to the field
independence-dependence concept is the matter of differential
valuing of the extremes of the "styles."

As Kogan (1973)

noted, the "purest" of style dimensions do not have value
judgments associated with their poles.

Witkin et al. (1971)

assert that psychological maladjustment is a function of
integration, not of differentiation, and that the adaptive
value of differentiation depends on the setting (e.g.,
cultural or cultural subgroup expectations) and upon the
occupation of the individual.

Despite all these qualifiers,

their bias in valuing field independence more highly than
field dependence appears to emerge in statements such as the
following:
A more field-independent mode of performing the
EFT is conceived as reflecting more developed
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cognitive functioning (p. 10) . . . O n the quite
specific ground that it involves "fulfillment of
the organism's potential," achievement of complex
structure or greater differentiation is, within
limits, to be valued over fixation at a more rudi
mentary level (p. 12) . . . Maturity, as commonly
conceived, connotes both developmental differen
tiation and effective integration.
(p. 13)
Thus in Witkin's view, the notion of a mature field dependent
individual is incongruous.

Kogan (1971) noted that despite

"lip service to a value-free study of cognition," field
independence is clearly considered a more mature and adaptive
mode of functioning.

Explicit training efforts are typi

cally in the direction of making people more field independent.
"Not much is said about enhancing field dependence through
training or of capitalizing upon the positive qualities of
field-dependent individuals" (p. 252).

The accumulated

research shows field-dependent individuals to be superior
to field-independent individuals in memory of social words
and memory for faces, and they require less time to reach a
group concensus.
There is now a good deal of evidence that these
individuals are more sensitive to social stimuli
than are field-independent persons . . . One may,
in fact, legitimately claim that a cognitive style
facilitating fine articulation and sensitivity to
the social environment is for many purposes more
highly adaptive than a style contributing to a
better articulation of the physical setting.
(Kogan, 1971, p. 253).
Ragan et al. (1979) also point out that:
Learning and performance of other jobs where inter
personal skills assume increased importance may be
difficult for the field-independent person. Such
jobs as teaching, law enforcement, and personnel
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management may rely upon the abilities of the fielddependent cognitive style.
(p. 12)
Regardless of its technical classification as an ability
or style dimension and the issue of possible overvaluation
of one of its poles, field independence-dependence is a
variable of considerable interest in the present study.
Because it is undoubtedly the most widely researched of
cognitive styles, a wealth of literature is available for
the present and continuing consideration of results.

Also,

it has been the subject of several studies directly issuing
from a laterality model, to be discussed below.

Distractibility:

Types A and B

Stephen Karp, a long-term associate of Witkin, published
a factor analytic study in 1963 (Karp, 1963) which convinc
ingly demonstrated that the ability to overcome the effects
of distracting contexts can be distinguished from the ability
to overcome effects of embedding contexts.

Karp described

the differences in the two types of tasks as follows:
With regard to the embedding context, each part of
the simple figure has also been used as part of a
different configuration. These configurations
serve to "break up" the simple figure, by embedding
its parts in other, more compelling, gestalts. In
contrast, the distracting context . . . leaves the
[figure] intact, although surrounded by considerable
extraneous material.
(Karp, 1962, p. 1)
Karp factor-analyzed six tests with distracting contexts
along with three tests of field dependence (EFT, RFT, and
BAT) and nine other measures, including several WAIS sub
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tests.

He extracted eight factors, and found that while

four of his distraction measures were highly loaded (.48 to
.61) on Factor 2 ("Overcoming Distracting Contexts"), none
of them loaded on the "Analytic Ability (overcoming embedded
ness)" Factor 1, which was defined primarily by EFT, RFT, and
BAT, all with Factor 1 loadings in the seventies.
Vocabulary did not load on either of these factors.

WAIS
However,

it is interesting to note that WAIS Block Design and Object
Assembly had moderate loadings on the embeddedness factor,
and WAIS Digit Symbol loaded on the distraction factor.
Karp's Arithmetic Operations (AO) test had the highest
loading of all his distraction tests on the distraction
factor, and this was the test utilized in the present study
as a measure of Distractibility (Type A).

Karp interpreted

this factor as "involving ability to manipulate or locate
items surrounded by a matrix of irrelevant items which serve
to distract the subject from performance on the task" (1962,
p. 6).

The nature of the AO task is described in more

detail in the Methods section to follow.
Traditionally, however, the most frequently used measure
of distractibility is the Stroop Color-Word Test (Stroop,
1935; cf. Ragan et al., 1979).

The Stroop was used as a

measure of "constricted vs. flexible control" by Gardner and
his associates (1959), who noted an apparent similarity of
this dimension to Witkin's field dependence-independence
dimension.

In the Gardner et al. study, Stroop interference
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scores did indeed correlate significantly (r = .54, £ < .01)
with field dependence for his female sample, although the
correlation coefficient reported for males (.21) is not
significant, considering his sample size (n = 30).

Santo-

stefano (1969) theoretically combined the constricted-flexible
control principle and the field dependence-independence con
struct and called the superordinate construct "field arti
culation. "
The question remained, however, of the empirical rela
tionship between field independence and the two types of
distraction measures (Karp's tests and the Stroop).

Two

subsequent factor analytic studies (Bone & Eysenck, 1972;
Sack & Rice, 1974) replicated and extended Karp's (1962)
findings, by showing the distractibility and field indepen
dence tests to load on different factors, and the Stroop
interference measure to load primarily on a third factor in
each case.

Sack and Rice called the Stroop factor "shifting,"

defined as "a voluntary change in an established attentional
focus" (p. 1005).

In the present study, the cognitive style

variable operationally defined by the Stroop test is called
Distractibility (Type B).

The nature of the Stroop test is

described in the Methods section below.

Reflection-Impulsivity
Jerome Kagan is well-known to developmental psycholo
gists for his important infant and infant-mother studies as

36

well as the famous 30-year longitudinal Fels study.

He is

also a major figure in the area of educational psychology
due to his research focus upon problem-solving behavior of
children.

While his contributions are thus primarily within

cognitive-developmental fields, his attention to personality
variables as well gives his perspective an unusually broad
quality.

His work has been called "at once connectionist

and cognitive, humanistic and behavioral" (Galloway, 1976,
p. 182).
Kagan's identification of a reflective-impulsive cogni
tive style dimension was associated with his studies of
children's problem-solving behavior.

He describes the

dimension as follows:
The reflection-impulsivity dimension describes the
degree to which a subject reflects upon the differ
ential validity of alternative solution hypotheses
in situations where many response possibilities are
available simultaneously. In these problem situations
the subjects with fast tempo impulsively report the
first hypothesis that occurs to them, and this re
sponse is typically incorrect. The reflective sub
ject on the other hand, delays a long time before
reporting a solution hypothesis and is usually
correct.
(Kagan, 1966, p. 119)
Massari (1975) simplifies the definition of reflectionimpulsivity to "the degree to which a person evaluates the
possible solution alternatives in situations of high response
uncertainty" (p. 61).
Reflection-impulsivity is measured by Kagan's Matching
Familiar Figures Test (MFFT), in which the subject must
select the exact duplicate of a given standard stimulus from
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an array of variants.

The examinee is scored for both latency

of initial responses and total number of errors made before
the correct match is made.
moderate (Ragan

Reliability of the MFFT is low to

et al., 1979), and yet the MFFT correlates

.40 and upward with a variety of tasks involving response
uncertainty (Kagan, Rosman, Day, Albert & Phillips, 1964;
Kogan, 1971).

Sex differences do not invariably appear, but

when they do, the difference is in the direction of females
being more reflective (Messer, 1976).
Reflectives are significantly more field independent
than impulsives.

In six studies reviewed by Messer (1976),

the correlations of MFFT latency score with the EFT ranged
from .18 to .38, while MFFT error score correlated with the
EFT from -.35 to -.62.

However, it is important to note that

these studies (just as the reliability and validity studies
reviewed) exclusively involved children as subjects.

In the

case of the studies of impulsivity-field dependence, the age
of subjects ranged from 3 years, 9 months to 14 years.

The

relationship of MFFT and EFT scores in adults is unknown.
Reflection-impulsivity appears to be related to the
cognitive control principle of "focusing-scanning" described
by Gardner and his associates in 1959.

Impulsives do not

visually scan all of the alternative stimuli in the MFFT
before responding, whereas reflectives do (Drake, 1970).
The reflective-impulsive dimension of cognitive style
has direct, proven relevance for educational settings (Kogan,
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1971) and has been most extensively studied in this context.
The more recent adult form of the MFFT (purchaseable directly
from Dr. Kagan) has yet to generate a research literature
comparable to that extant for children.
In his review of the reflection-impulsivity literature,
Messer (1976) emphasizes relatively recent criticisms of the
usual double-median-split method of categorizing impulsives
and reflectives.

Traditionally, only those scoring below

the median for latency and above the median in errors have
been classified as impulsives; the converse group (high
latency and low errors), reflectives.

Fast-accurate and

slow-inaccurate groups were ignored.

This squandering of

data results in loss of statistical power and results in
analysis of variance designs whereas multiple regression
techniques have been suggested as more appropriate.

Conceptual Differentiation and Category Width
In 1956, Jerome Bruner and his associates (Bruner,
Goodnow, & Austin, 1956) demonstrated that individuals vary
in a self-consistent manner in their estimation of extreme
limits of a wide variety of categories.

For example, in

selecting the darkest and lightest brightness of an over
cast sky, or the highest and lowest pitch of a female singing
voice, subjects tended to be consistently broad, medium, or
narrow in their limit-selection of categories, relative to
the total group.
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This interesting cognitive style dimension is defined
by Messick (1976) as "consistent preferences for broad inclu
siveness as opposed to narrow exclusiveness in establishing
the acceptable range for specified categories" (p. 15).

It

has been variously called "category width," "breadth of cate
gorization," "equivalence range," "(conceptual) band width"
(Messick, 1976), and "coarseness-fineness" in categorizing
(Fillenbaum, 1959).
Gardner and his associates (1959) used the term "equi
valence range" to refer to a somewhat different type of task.
In a free-sorting situation, individuals had been found to
vary in terms of the number of sub-categories they spontane
ously created.

A broad equivalence range was inferred from

the creation of relatively few categories; a narrow equivalence
range was inferred from creation of relatively many categories.
Later, performance on the free-sort type of task in terms of
number of different categories generated by the subject came
to be called "conceptual differentiation" (Messick, 1976),
which Messick defined as "individual differences in the ten
dency to categorize perceived similarities and differences
among stimuli in terms of many differentiated concepts or
dimensions" (p. 15).
The similarity of the dimensions of category width and
conceptual differentiation is apparent, and in fact these
and the aforementioned terms are frequently confused or used
interchangeably.

However, Sloane, Gorlow, and Jackson (1963)
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found a variety of sorting tests to load on a single factor,
whereas various other measures of conceptual band width and
"associative ease" (or lack of criticalness) loaded on clearly
different factors.

Messick (1976) has made the careful dis

tinction that conceptual differentiation "refers to the
relative multiplicity of distinctions between or among con
cepts, while category width or equivalence range refers to the
extent of a single concept's range of reference" (pp. 15-16).
In the present study, this conceptual distinction has been
maintained, with separate measures included to

represent the

two dimensions of conceptual differentiation and category width.
Bruner and Tajfel (1961) report a positive correlation
between narrow category width and tests of intelligence.
However, Messick and Kogan (1965) found that when there is a
large numerical spread in the response alternatives on quan
titative multiple-choice tests, broad categorizers do better
than narrow categorizers.

This relationship disappears if

actual computations are required, or if the response alter
natives are narrowly spaced.

In a rather complicated study

of line-length judgments under Noise and No-Noise conditions,
narrow categorizers were significantly less accurate in the
discriminations under the noise-free condition.

Under the

noise condition, no main effect of category width was found,
but its interaction with sex was significant:

Narrow cate

gory width males were more accurate, while broad category
width females were more accurate.

In an all-male sample,
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broad category width correlated significantly with the total
number of adjectives checked as self-descriptive on the Adjec
tive Check List, interpreted as "self-concept span" (r = .30,
p < .01; Pettigrew, 1958).

In an all-female sample (Petti

grew, 1958), category width was unrelated to the F (authori
tarianism) scale and to the Rokeach Dogmatism scale.

Wallach

and Kogan (1965) found significant positive correlations of
category breadth and divergent-thinking tests of creativity,
the broader categorizers demonstrating greater divergence, at
least among children.

Narrow categorizers do better than

broad categorizers on a memory-for-faces task (Messick &
Damarin, 1964).

Most studies report females to be narrower

categorizers than males (Pettigrew, 1958; Bieri, 1969).
While conceptual differentiation as measured by sorting
tasks has been found to correlate positively with category
width in a number of studies (cf. Ragan et al., 1979), others
have shown a lack of consistency between the two dimensions
of cognitive style.

Conceptual differentiation (number of

groups created in a sorting task) correlates positively with
vocabulary level and verbal knowledge (Messick & Kogan, 1963).
The tendency to "compartmentalize," or form "groups" con
taining only single items, correlates negatively with
measures of creativity (cf. Ragan et al., 1979).

Lack of

differentiation (creation of relatively few groups) is signi
ficantly related to a stylistic preference for extremelyworded, sweeping generalizations (Clayton & Jackson, 1961);
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on the other hand, high differentiation (large number of
groups) is significantly related with authoritarian item con
tent when it is stated in probabilistic terms (Clayton & Jackson, 1961).

The correlations reported by Gardner et al. (1959)

of sorting task scores with EFT and Stroop performance of both
males and females are nonsignificant, when their sample sizes
are considered.
The most popular measure of category width appears to be
the paper-and-pencil category width scale of Pettigrew (Petti
grew, 1958; cf. Kogan, 1971, and Ragan et al., 1979).

An

abbreviated form of this test, consisting of only those items
which discriminated between the broad and narrow thirds of the
sample at the .10 level or better (Pettigrew, 1958) was utilized
in the present study.

In regard to the conceptual differentia

tion dimension, no standard instrument of assessment has yet
been developed (Ragan et al., 1979).

Clayton and Jackson (1961)

used lists of written objects for sorting, and scores on these
sorting tasks loaded on the same factor as scores on sorting
tasks using actual objects (Sloane et al., 1963).

Unfortunate

ly, Clayton and Jackson did not publish the lists of objects
they used.

Therefore, a written sorting task was created for

the present study, which included the same number of items as
previous sort tasks, based upon the same criteria for item
inclusion (Clayton & Jackson, 1961; Gardner et al., 1959).

Cognitive Complexity
"Of the various cognitive styles and strategies . . .
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cognitive complexity-simplicity is most strongly beset by
problems of adequacy of conceptualization and method" (Kogan,
1971, p. 271).

In most general terms, cognitive complexity is

defined as "individual differences in the tendency to construe
the world in a multidimensional and complex qay" (Ragan et al.,
1979).

However, some researchers stress only the number of

different dimensions used by individuals in analyzing their
environment, and others take into account the "hierarchicintegration " structure of the dimensions employed.
The first approach, the "differentiation" view of cog
nitive complexity, originated in the personal constructs
theory of George Kelly (1955).

Kelly devised a Role Con

structs Repertory (REP) Test, to measure the complexity of
an individual's personal construct repertoire utilized in
judging similarities and differences in his or her social
environment.

The REP test was quite cumbersome in its

original form, and a modified form of the REP (Tripodi &
Bieri, 1963) simplified administration and scoring and also
correlated substantially with the original REP test (Jaspars,
1964; Tripodi & Bieri, 1963).
Cognitive complexity in the sense proposed by Kelly is
unrelated to vocabulary and verbal intelligence, at least
among college students (Bieri, 1961; Bieri & Blacker, 1956 ).'
However, "total complexity" (a composite of the REP and other
measures of complexity including the Barron-Welsh Art Scale)
correlates significantly with "reputational Social IQ," a

44

measure based upon sociometric peer ratings (r = .54 p < .01;
Sechrest & Jackson, 1961).

Bieri (1955) found that high-

complex subjects were more accurate than low-complex subjects
in the accurate prediction of differences between the self
and others, although they were not more accurate in the pre
diction of similarities.

Consistently, low-complex judges

appear to be better attuned to discriminating regularities
in the social environment in a sequential judgment task,
but high-complex judges show superior processing of incongruent information

(Tripodi & Bieri, 1964).

Also, high-

complex judges are more confident in their judgments of
incongruency, while low-complex judges express more certainty
about their judgments of congruent information (Tripodi &
Bieri, 1964).

In impression-formation tasks, low-complex

individuals respond more to superficial qualities of behavior,
in contrast to high-complex individuals, who pay greater
attention to inner psychological states (Leventhal & Singer,
1964).

High-complex persons project more conflict into TAT

stories (Tripodi & Bieri, 1966), and complexity correlates
significantly with four different

indices of determinant

complexity as well as with two indices of content complexity
on the Rorschach (Bieri & Blacker, 1956).

A detailed review

of this type of cognitive complexity, as well as an explicit
description of the modified REP test (which was utilized in
the present study), may be found in Bieri, Atkins, Briar,
Leaman, Miller, & Tripodi (1966).
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A second and quite different view of cognitive complex
ity is based upon the conceptual systems theory of Harvey,
Hunt, and Schroder (1961).

This is the "integrative com

plexity" model which purports to be concerned with cognition
in general, as opposed to just persons and social environ
ments.

It takes into account a dimension of concreteness-

abstractness as well as criteria such as absolutism, the
presence and nature of qualifications, and relationships to
authority, and thus complexity is determined more by the
quality of constructs than by their multiplicity.

The measure

of integrative complexity is the "This I Believe" Test (TIB),
which is a sentence-completion task.

With intensive training,

judges are reportedly able to achieve high interscorer
reliabilities with the TIB (Greaves, 1971).

Also, it does

not appear to make any difference whether the TIB is admin
istered in its original timed form or under the condition of
no time limit (Greaves, 1971).
Unlike the type of complexity measured by the REP,
integrative complexity is quite strongly correlated with
verbal IQ (r = .40; Schroder, Driver & Streufert, 1967).
Integrative complexity is unrelated, however, to mere verbal
fluency (length of sentence completions) and Edwards Social
Desirability (Schroder et al., 1967).
Harvey (1966) reports that integrative complexity is
related to the REP, although he does not report the magnitude
or significance level of the correlation.

In a factor
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analytic study of complexity, Vannoy (1965) found the two
measures to load on different factors.

Apparently, addi

tional study is needed to clarify the relationship of com
plexity as measured by the REP, and integrative complexity.
The dimensions of cognitive style of relevance to the
present study have been reviewed.

In the sections to follow,

evidence of functional asymmetries in the human brain will
be presented, followed by a review of studies which investi
gate a possible relationship between differential brain
hemispheric function and cognitive style.

Functional Brain Asyirmetries:

Pathological Groups

For over a century, it has been known that the left
cerebral hemisphere in most humans is the dominant hemisphere
for speech as well as motor control of the usually preferred
(right) hand.

"By a curious extrapolation, the left hemis

phere also came to be regarded as dominant for all complex
cognitive processes, with the right of lesser importance,
except for elementary sensory and motor functions" (Milner,
1971, p. 272).

Hence, the left hemisphere was called the

"major" hemisphere, the right, "minor."

This traditional

view has now been largely rejected, with the breakthrough
occurring on the basis of clinical studies of well-lateralized
brain lesions in the 1940's, split-brain animal studies in
the 1950's, and perhaps most dramatically, studies of human
commissurotomy (split-brain) patients in the 1960's.
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The human cerebral commissurotomies were performed in
cases of intractible convulsive disorders, in efforts to
confine the seizures to one side of the brain.

The surgery

resulted in an apparent lack of change in personality and
ordinary behavior.

However, special testing under the direc

tion of R. W. Sperry indicated "functional disengagement of
the right and left hemispheres with respect to nearly all
cognitive and other psychic activities.

Learning and memory

(were) found to proceed quite independently in each separated
hemisphere" (Sperry, Gazzaniga & Bogen, 1969, p. 275).
Objects seen in one visual hemifield were not perceived or
remembered in the other.

Pictures or objects presented to

the right hemisphere were reported by patients to be "nothing,"
or at most, a "flash of light;" yet these stimuli could be
recognized and identified nonverbally, such as by pointing.
If a pair of different objects was presented simultaneously
to the right and left hemifields, the left hand (right hemis
phere) selected only the object pictured in the left hemi
field (right hemisphere); but if asked to name the object,
the patient responded only with the name of the other, righthemifield (left hemisphere) object and verbally denied seeing
anything but the latter.

In this sense, only the hemisphere

capable of naming objects was "conscious."
Each of the separated hemispheres has its own visual
sensations, percepts, associated concepts and shortand long-term memories . . . (I)t is as if two
separate brains were viewing the left and right
halves of the visual field, only one of which is
able to communicate what it sees through speech or
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writing.

(Sperry et al., 1969, p. 278 )

Similarly, objects placed in the right hand were named, de
scribed, and handled normally; patients were unable to name
or describe objects held out of sight in the left hand.

If

different objects were placed in both hands at once, the
patient denied even the presence of a stimulus in the left
hand.
Sperry and his co-workers found not only a functional
disengagement of the two hemispheres of the commissurotomized
patients, but also functional asymmetries which went beyond
verbal expression.

While the left hemisphere appeared

dominant for numerical calculations as well as for speech
and writing, the right hemisphere was superior to the left
in spatial constructions.

Milner and Taylor (1972) subse

quently submitted compelling evidence of the isolated right
hemisphere's superiority in the perception of spatial
patterns.

The isolated right hemisphere is more adept at

classifying pictures of objects according to shape, while
the left hemisphere excels at classification based upon
function (Levy & Trevarthem, 1976).

Right-hemispheric

lesions in the temporal-parietal area are associated with
a variety of spatial deficits including visual closure tasks
and the perception of faces in high-contrast drawings (Ben
ton, 1979).
The right hemisphere is not entirely lacking in verbal

ability.

When testing conditions were arranged to permit an

appropriate (nonverbal) response, the right hemisphere of
split-brain patients could read many words and understand
spoken sentences (Bogen, 1969a, 1979).

Additional studies

of hemispherectomy and unilateral lesion patients demonstrated
that the right hemisphere comprehends nouns better than verbs
(Bogen, 1969a) and can direct the verbalization of descrip
tive phrases, similes, and metaphorical expressions appro
priately (Bogen, 1969b).

Following complete left hemis

pherectomy, an individual may retain the capacity to sing,
pray, and utter oaths (Smith, 1966).

Bogen (1969b) concluded

that it is not the mere possession of words which differen
tiates the hemispheres, but rather, the use of words in
"propositional" vs. "appositional" thought.

Propositional

thinking, he suggested, is logical, convergent and analytic,
whereas appositional thought is intuitive, divergent, and
gestalt (cf. Corballis, 1980).
Certain aspects of musical ability, such as melody and
rhythm perception, also appear to be represented in the right
hemisphere (Bogen, 1969b).

Alajouanine (1948) observed

characteristics of creative artists who acquired
(left hemisphere damage).

aphasia

The musician (Ravel) lost his

ability to read musical notation, but he was unimpaired in
melodic, rhythmic and stylistic sense and in playing or
singing from memory.

Conversely, right temporal lobectomy has

been associated with impaired discrimination of tonal patterns.
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tone quality and timbre (Milner, 1967).

Motor amusia

(avocalia), or inability to reproduce tones, has been related
to unilateral right (or bilateral) lesions, while musical
comprehension deficits have been clinically observed more
frequently with left-sided lesions (Hecaen, 1969).
Lateral asymmetries have also been observed in clinical
populations in the area of emotional expression.

Flor-Henry

(1969a, 1969b, 1972) reported a preponderance of left-sided
and bilateral temporal lobe epilepsies among schizophrenic
and schizo-affective psychotics, while right-sided epileptics
were most frequently diagnosed manic-depressive.

Lishman

(1968) found more "intellectual" impairments among left
sided brain-injured individuals, and more affective disorders
among the right.

Comparing self-ratings with ratings by

others of the interictal (between-seizure) behavior of
temporal lobe epileptics, Bear and Fedio (1977) found the
right-lesion group to unde'rate their own sadness and
aggression and overrate their own conscientious behavior
("image-polishing").

Conversely, the left-lesion group

described themselves as angry, paranoid, and dependent and
underrated their own conscientiousness ("image-tarnishing").
In response to intracarotid sodium amobarbital injection,
which briefly anesthetizes one hemisphere of the brain, a
"catastrophic" reaction more frequently follows anesthesia
of the left hemisphere, while a "euphoric-maniacal" reaction
more frequently follows right-hemisphere inactivation
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(Gainotti, 1972; Rossi & Rosadini, 1967).

Milner (1967) was

unable to replicate these findings, however, with 104 Cana
dian patients undergoing the amobarbital test.
Flor-Henry (1976) studied groups of schizophrenics and
affective psychotics without epilepsy, and reported both
neuropsychological and EEG test data implicating left temporal
lobe dysfunction in the former and bilateral (but predomin
antly right temporal) abnormality in the latter.

Yozawitz

and his co-workers (Yozawitz, Bruder, Sutton, Sharpe, Gurland,
Fleiss, & Costa, 1979) found left-right ear preferences of
affective psychotics on a dichotic listening task to resemble
those found among patients with known right-hemispheric
lesions.

Bipolar illness followed right hemispherectomy in

a recent case

report (Forrest, 1982), which highlights the

issue of whether differential emotional reactions may be
associated with hemisphere-specific dysfunction or failure
to inhibit processes of the other hemisphere (cf. D. Tucker,
1981).
Stern (1977) and Galin, Diamond, and Braff (1977) re
ported greater incidence of left-sided than right-sided
dysfunction in cases of hysterical conversion reactions.
They suggested that the right hemisphere may play a central
role in the mediation of affectively or motivationally
determined somatic symptoms.

Bishop, Mobley, and Farr (1978),

however, failed to confirm a predominance of left-sided
occurrence of conversion symptoms.

They noted that the left

52

sided predominance was observed only among female subjects
and thus the effect may be related to sex.
The foregoing review is more accurately an overview of
the extensive clinical literature regarding functional brain
asymmetries.

More detailed reviews are available in the areas

of commissurotomy (Bogen, 1979; Gazzaniga, 1970), unilateral
lesion syndromes (Heilman & Valenstein, 1979), and psycho
pathology and hemispheric dysfunction (Marin & G. Tucker,
1981; D. Tucker, 1981).

The purposes of the present overview

are only to illustrate the range of functional brain asymme
tries found among clinical populations, and to emphasize
that in the surgically separated state, the two hemispheres
are capable of functioning quite independently, although in
qualitatively different modes.

Functional Brain Asymmetries:

Nonpathological Groups

Surgical disconnection may provide an unusual and drama
tic opportunity to directly investigate the differential
capacities and functions of the brain hemispheres , but the
question naturally arises as to generality of the findings
to normal, intact human brains.

Prior to disconnection of

the hemispheres, commissurotomy patients manifested extremely
abnormal brain function which, after all, necessitated the
operation.

Similarly, we cannot assume that the left and

right hemispheres of the normally integrated brain are
functionally lateralized in the same manner as those of
unilateral lesion or psychiatric populations.
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Investigation of functional brain asymmetries in nonpathological populations is hampered by the methodological
problem of how to assess differential hemispheric involve
ment in the characteristic or performance under study.
Basically, this assessment takes one of three forms:

(1) EEG

analysis, which is a direct measure of surface activity of
the brain, (2) unilateral stimulus presentation, such as in
tachistoscopic or dichotic listening studies, or (3) obser
vational or other indirect methods, which are theoretically
assumed to reflect differential hemispheric involvement.
Electroencephalographic (EEG) studies of differential
hemispheric function among nonpatients have taken one of two
forms:

measurement of alpha-wave suppression (an indication

of corticol arousal) in different areas of the brain, or
asymmetries in evoked potentials from the right and left
hemispheres.

By such methods, the left cerebral hemisphere

of normal subjects appears to be more active than the right
hemisphere during arithmetic and verbal or linguistic task
performance, while the right hemisphere appears to be more
involved than the left during performance of visuospatial
and musical tasks (Buchsbaum & Fedio, 1970; Galin & Ornstein,
1972; McAdam & Whitaker, 1971; McKee, Humphrey & McAdam,
1973; Morgan, McDonald & MacDonald, 1971; Morrell & Salamy,
1971; Wood, Goff & Day, 1971).

In addition, differential

hemispheric arousal has been associated with varying affec
tive states (Harman & Ray, 1977; Tucker, Stenslie, Roth &
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Shearer, 1981), although the findings in this area are more
inconsistent, possibly due to ambiguities in definitions of
"positive" and "negative" affect (cf. Tucker et al., 1981).
Tachistoscopic (T-scope) presentation allows investiga
tion of differential reaction times to visual stimuli in the
right hemifield (left hemisphere) vs. left hemifield (right
hemisphere).

This method also reveals left-hemispheric

superiority in normals for verbal material (and easily
verbally-labelled objects), and right-hemispheric superiority
in face recognition, perception of the location and quantity
of dots, line slope discrimination and depth perception
(Arndt & Berger, 1978; Kimura, 1966; Kinsbourne, 1970;
McKeever & Huling, 1970; Milner, 1971; Rizzolatti, Umilta
& Berlucchi, 1971).

Similarly, dichotic listening studies

indicate greater left-hemispheric (right-ear) proficiency in
the discrimination of digits, consonants, words, and semantic
content, and greater right-hemispheric (left-ear) proficiency
in recognition of simple pitch patterns, melodies, environ
mental sounds, nonverbal human sounds such as crying, shrieking
and laughing, and emotional tone of voice (Carmon & Nachshon,
1973; Haggard & Parkinson, 1971; Kimura, 1963, 1964, 1967;
Knox & Kimura, 1970; Mazzucchi & Parma, 1978; Milner, 1971;
Safer

&

Leventhal,

1977).

Right-ear (left-hemispheric)

attentional bias has also been associated with decrements in
visual imagery, trait anxiety, and an induced depressive mood
(Tucker et al., 1981).
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Interestingly, lateralization of some musical functions
may depend in part upon the degree of musical training.
Bever and Chiarello (1974) found a left-hemispheric super
iority among trained musicians in melody recognition, while
nonmusicians demonstrated the more typical right-hemispheric
advantage on this task.

Similarly, an EEG study showed

greater left-hemispheric activity in musicians when whistling
a song, but greater right-hemispheric activation in non
musicians performing the same task (Davidson & Schwartz, 1977).
A variant of the unilateral stimulus presentation
methodology is the "chimeric face paradigm," in which the
subject is presented with one-half of a photographed face
combined with its mirror-image.

Studies utilizing this

paradigm suggest that the left side of a viewed face (which
is the right side of the face being viewed) is considered
most similar to the original photographed face (Gilbert and
Bakan, 1973), and that it is judged more emotionally expres
sive than the right side of the viewed face (Campbell,
1978), even though actual left-face composites are rated
as expressing emotion more intensely than right-face com
posites (Sackeim, Gur & Saucy, 1978).

Campbell (1978) has

noted the "intriguing possibility . . . that the side of the
face which dominates a viewer's impression when he is looking
at another person is not the side which the expressor is
using most strongly" (p. 338).

In any case, these studies

suggest greater right- than left-hemispheric involvement in
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both the perception and expression of affect (cf. Hayne,
Note 3).
The third general type of investigation of laterality
effects in nonpathological groups includes those studies
utilizing observational or inferential measures of hemis
pheric involvement.

By far, the most common measure of this

type is the observation and quantification of lateral eye
movements (LEMs) in response to questions requiring some
degree of reflective thought.

Merle Day (1964) originally

described the LEM phenomenon, which is a tendency for
individuals to look briefly to the right or left after pre
sentation of an oral question and prior to oral response.
However, Bakan (1969) was the first to propose that LEMs may
be an index of hemispheric asymmetry, a position elaborated
in more explicit neuropsychological terms by Kinsbourne (1972,
1974).

Theoretically, a lateral eye movement under the im

posed reflective condition is indicative of activation of
the contralateral hemisphere.

While some investigators

utilizing the LEM method focus upon contrasting characteris
tics of "right-lookers" (or right-movers) and "left-lookers"
(left-movers)— i.e., groups of subjects displaying a dispro
portionate number of LEMs to the right or left--others focus
on the situational factors which may affect direction of
initial gaze shifts.
In support of his proposal of LEMs as an index of
hemispheric asymmetry, Bakan (1969) provided evidence that

left-lookers (right-hemispheric "types") possessed clearer
visual imagery, were more susceptible to hypnosis, and more
frequently chose "soft majors" as opposed to "hard" scientific
majors than right-lookers.

Morgan, McDonald and MacDonald

(1971) also reported an association between left lateral eye
movements and hypnotizability.

Harnad (1972) found left-

lookers to score higher than right-lookers on the Remote
Associates Test, a presumed measure of creativity.

Left-

lookers are more "inner attentive" than right-lookers, as
determined by a combined score on the Repression-Sensitiza
tion scale and an imagery test (Meskin & Singer, 1974).

Gur

and Gur (1975) found a positive association between left
looking and incidence of psychosomatic symptoms as well as
greater utilization of the defense mechanisms of repression
and denial.

More left lateral eye movemenets were observed

among college students classified as "hysteric" in style on
the basis of a modified Rorschach procedure, as opposed to
those classified as "obsessive-compulsive" (Smokier &
Shevrin, 1979).
While the earliest LEM research focused upon personality
differences of left and right hemispheric "types" of indivi
duals, a somewhat later development was an emphasis upon the
effect of task and situation variables upon lateral eye move
ments.

This direction of LEM research, based upon the

Kinsbourne (1972, 1974) theoretical model, is exemplified
by studies showing relationships between right LEMs and
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verbal, numerical, and nonemotional item content, and between
left LEMs and musical, spatial, and emotional item content
(Gur, Gur & Harris, 1975; Schwartz, Davidson & Maer, 1975;
Weitan & Etaugh, 1976).

Situational variables which have

been related to LEM behavior include experimenter location
(Gur, Gur & Harris, 1975) and experimentally-induced stress,
or performance anxiety (D. Tucker, Roth, Arneson & Buckingham,
1977) , the latter being associated with increased frequency
of left lateral eye movements.
The early LEM studies generated considerable excitement,
not only because of positive and theoretically meaningful
findings, but also because of the relative ease of LEM
assessments.

However, the LEM-hemispheric asymmetry model

has been criticized due to mixed experimental outcomes,
methodological inconsistencies, and theoretical ambiguities.
Of 19 experiments comparing LEM response to "left-hemispheric"
vs. "right-hemispheric" questions, for example, only nine
yielded results in the expected direction (Ehrlichman &
Weinberger, 1978).
In addition to the LEM observational procedure, later
ality among nonpathological groups has been assessed indirectly
by means of self-report questionnaires.

Questionnaires of

this type include the Zenhausern Preference Test (Zenhausern,
1978) and the Verbalizer-Visualizer Questionnaire (Richardson,
1977).

Both of these questionnaires purport to assess visual
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vs. nonvisual thinking style.

Theoretically, the two styles

are a direct consequence of cerebral dominance, the visual
mode being associated with right hemispheric dominance, the
nonvisual or verbal, with left hemispheric dominance.
Using an early form of the Zenhausern test (ZEN) in
conjunction with a similar questionnaire, Zenhausern and
Gebhardt (1979) investigated the relationship of hemispheric
dominance to the recall of words both high and low in imagery
value, with auditory and visual presentation.

Their findings

included significant three- and four-way interactions which
nearly defy comprehension, and even the authors dismiss these
in their discussion except to remark that "their mere exis
tence . . . supports the use of hemispheric dominance as a
meaningful classifying variable" (p. 73).

However, their

main finding was of a consistent relationship between audi
tory input and a left-hemispheric style on the one hand, and
between visual input and a right-hemispheric style on the
other.

This pattern of relationships was interpreted as con

sistent with the theory of left-hemispheric specialization
for sequential auditory input, and right-hemispheric special
ization for visual-spatial information processing.
In a similarly complex research design, Coleman and
Zenhausern (1979) compared male and female left- and rightdominant groups, on a discriminative reaction-time task in
which both target and probe stimuli were varied (words or
pictures).

Somewhat confusingly, "right dominants," as
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identified by agreement between the ZEN and a similar ques
tionnaire, were faster in reaction time on the discrimination
task than "left dominants," but at the same time, reaction
time was significantly faster for probes presented to the
left-hemisphere than for probes presented to the righthemisphere.

The faster left-hemisphere processing was ob

served for both words and pictures, and the effect was four
times stronger in "left dominants" than "right dominants."
Again, the reader will not be subjected to the interpre
tive throes of a significant three-way interaction of target
type, probe type, and hemispheric dominance.

Generally, the

authors interpreted the findings as indicative of "two
distinct groups:

one which is more efficient in tasks that

demand a parallel processing mode, and another which is more
efficient at tasks that demand a sequential processing mode"
(p. 360).
Zenhausern and Gebhardt (1979) report a 70% agreement
between the early ZEN questionnaire and the "Your Style of
Learning and Thinking" questionnaire (Torrance, Reynolds,
Riegel & Ball, 1971), another purported measure of subjective
p.eference for right-hemispheric vs. left-hemispheric func
tions.

Reliability of the ZEN measure is unknown.

The Verbalizer-Visualizer Questionnaire (VVQ) of Rich- ardson (1977) is similar in item content to the ZEN.

The

VVQ was empirically derived from Paivio's (1971) 86-item
Ways of Thinking questionnaire on the basis of item corre
lation with left lateral eye movements.

Richardson reports
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a seven-day test-retest reliability of .91 and freedom from
social desirability response bias (correlations with the
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale ranged from .00 to
-.07 in the original series of studies).

Reliability was

substantially lower with a different, younger sample and
longer (three week) test-retest interval (Warren & Good, 1979).
However, the validity of the W Q was supported in the Warren
and Good study by discriminating subjects who responded
favorably and those who responded less favorably to a parti
cular (verbal) therapy mode.

Additional data summaries pro

vided by the author with a copy of his test (Richardson, Note
4) revealed that, while a 1979 sample of females continued
to demonstrate nonsignificant correlations of W Q
desirability, W Q

and social

scores of a 1979 male sample were signifi

cantly correlated with social desirability (r = -.38, p < .01,
n = 49).

Since the W Q is scored in the direction of visual

izing tendency, results indicated that the higher the visual
izing tendency of these male subjects, the lower the social
desirability scores.

Richardson (1977) relies primarily upon

the studies of Kinsbourne (1972) and Kocel, Galin, Ornstein
& Merrin (1972) as theoretical bases for the presumed rela
tionship between self-reported visualizing tendency and
hemispheric specialization.
In summary, an impressive number of EEG and bilateral
stimulus presentation studies, as well as a substantial pro
portion of the LEM studies, point to hemispheric specialization
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in nonpathological groups that is similar to that demonstrated
with clinical populations.

Specifically, the left hemisphere

appears to be specialized for the processing of verbal and
linguistic information, while the right hemisphere appears to
be more involved in visuospatial and some musical functions
(at least among nonmusicians).

Also,

studies have been re

viewed which suggest a special but not yet well-defined role
in the processing of emotional stimuli, and possibly in per
sonality characteristics such as suggestibility and features
consistent with an hysteric personality style.
Based upon the evidence of functional brain asymmetries
in both clinical and nonpathological groups, several leading
investigators (e.g., Bogen, 1969a; Levy, 1969; Nebes, 1974)
have suggested a neuropsychological model of cognitive style.
According to this model, the two hemispheres of the brain are
not merely specialized to deal with differing task content
(i.e., verbal vs. nonverbal).
for different processing modes.

Rather, they are specialized
The mode of the left hemis

phere is analytic, sequential, and logical.

Its facility

with linguistic material and propositional speech is com
patible with this mode, although the cause-effect relation
ship between language development and left-hemispheric cog
nitive style is the subject of current speculation (cf.
Joseph, 1982).

The mode of the right hemisphere is global

or holistic, nonsequential, and intuitive in nature— hence
its demonstrated superiority in a variety of tasks requiring
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pattern perception and construction, its facility for simile
and metaphor even when propositional speech is absent, and
its sensitivity to emotional and other nonverbal environmental
cues.

Galin (1974) eloquently compared current notions of

left-right hemispheric style with Freud's early structural
theory, noting the irony that perhaps the neuropsychological
view will eventually reaffirm a structural basis for uncon
scious process.

He noted several congruencies of right-hemis

pheric functioning with the primary process, a form of thought
originally assigned to the Unconscious:

nonverbal mode of

representation, nonlinear mode of association, less involve
ment with perception of time and sequence, and nonpropositional speech (e.g., metaphors, puns, double-entendre— "word
pictures").

Conversely, left-hemispheric style is congruent

with conscious, goal-directed, sequential, verbal, logical
secondary-process thinking.
However, our goal is not to simply translate the terms
of one theoretical model into those of another.

Rather, we

shall first review those studies directly involved in deter
mining relationships between laterality measures and tradi
tional tests of cognitive style, followed by delineation of
objectives of the present study.

Laterality and Cognitive Style
Studies designed to specifically investigate relation
ships between differential hemispheric function and traditional
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measures of cognitive style are relatively few in number.
Of 644 bibliographic citations in a quite recent review of
the cognitive style literature (Back et al., 1979), only 14
involved the concept of lateralized brain function in any
way (if we include, for example, studies of hand, ear or eye
dominance in relation to cognitive style).

Of the traditional

cognitive style dimensions, these studies were nearly exclu
sively concerned with field dependence-independence.
A study of unilateral lesion patients (Russo & Vignolo,
1967) led to tentative conceptualization of field independence
as a manifestation of analytic, left-hemispheric capacity.
However, the relationship of laterality and field indepen
dence appears to be more complex.

Several studies have shown

more field independent subjects to evidence greater lefthemispheric lateralization for verbal functions (Pizzamiglio,
1974; Pizzamiglio & Carli, 1974; Pizzamiglio & Cecchini,
1971; Waber, 1976), but Oltman, Ehrlichman & Cox (1976) found
that more field independent subjects also demonstrated greater
right-hemispheric specialization in a face perception task.
Oltman et al. suggest that field independence tasks may re
quire both perceptual analysis and synthesis, and thus field
independence may be a function of greater lateralization of
both left- and right-hemispheric functions.

Zoccolotti &

Oltman (1978) compared field independent and dependent sub
jects on both left- and right-hemispheric tasks.

They found,

as expected, that the field independent group not only showed
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a greater right-hemifield (left-hemispheric) superiority in
letter recognition but also a greater left-hemifield (righthemispheric) superiority in face discrimination.

They reported

an overall correlation of .35 (£ < .10) between extent of
right-hemifield superiority for letter discrimination and
left-hemifield superiority for face discrimination.

Field

dependent subjects did not demonstrate significant hemifield
differences on either type of task.

"Apparently, the field-

dependent-independent dimension is related to the degree of
segregation of functioning between the two hemispheres,
rather than to some generalized tendency to use one or the
other" (Zoccolotti & Oltman, 1978, p. 161).

In support of

this view, Silverman, Adevai and McGough (1966) had found nonright-handed individuals to be more field dependent than
clearly right-handed individuals, suggesting that greater
specialization of lateral function may be associated with
field independence.

D. Tucker (1976), utilizing a more

sophisticated measure of lateral brain involvement than
handedness, found both hemispheres to show EEG desynchroni
zation during EFT performance.
If field independence is a function of greater bilateral
specialization of function, one would expect a stronger asso
ciation between right LEMs

and verbal questions, and between

left Lems and spatial questions, in more field independent
individuals.

However, Ehrlichman, Weiner and Baker (1974)

found the opposite.

Content-specific LEMs were less evident
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among field independent subjects than among their field
dependent counterparts.

Tucker (Note 5) found no association

between right and left LEMs and field independence among either
college students or young children, but in both groups, he
found a positive relationship between field independence and
frequency of nonlateral eye movements.

In his discussion of

these apparently inconsistent findings, Tucker noted that the
unilateral stimulus presentation methods of Zoccolotti and
Oltman and others tend to maximize lateralized processing,
whereas the LEM procedure constitutes a free-choice situation
in terms of task approach.

Thus more field independent indi

viduals may manifest greater functional differentiation of
the hemispheres upon "demand," but on the LEM, their per
formance may reflect relatively bilateral usage associated
with greater integration.

We are reminded of the distinc

tion of Wachtel (1968) between capacity and style in analytic
functioning, and of the fixity-mobility factor in field inde
pendence (Witkin et al., 1971).

Possibly, field independent

functioning requires a capacity for specialized hemispheric
task performance, but not an exclusively or even predominant
reliance upon this mode in a naturalistic setting.

On the

contrary, field independent subjects may manifest greater
bilateral, "integrated," or "mobile" usage in such a situation.
Integration of specialized hemispheric functions was
viewed by Bogen and Bogen (1969) as the basis of creativity.
The hemispheres are not as much "major" and "minor"
as . . . they are complementary, and each hemisphere
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is capable of thinking on its own, in its own way
. . . Specialization of the hemispheres for different
modes of thought greatly increases the flexibility
and creativity of the ensemble.
(p. 194)
While creativity is a general term which has been variously
defined in terms of product, person, context and process
variables (cf. Taylor, 1975), it is of relevance to the field
of cognitive style because of the previously discussed
associations between creative personality and cognitive
style dimensions including reflection-impulsivity, rigidity,
and figural complexity preference.

A neuropsychological

model of cognitive processes may generate additional hypo
theses regarding the relationship between differential
hemispheric function and cognitive style dimensions relevant
to some aspects of the creative process.

The Bogen and

Bogen (1 969) model of creativity recognizes both lefthemispheric and right-hemispheric contributions, i.e., a
differentiated and integrated state.

Regarding the role

of the right hemisphere in the creative process, they ob
serve that "there are many persons possessing technical
proficiency in music, drawing, or writing whose production
is devoid of those innovative and informative values which
distinguish an artist from a performer" (pp. 200-201).

On

the other hand, they quote Bruner to emphasize the role of
the left hemisphere:
As surely as the recital of a daydream differs from
the well-wrought tale, there is a barrier between
undisciplined fantasy and Art. To climb the barrier
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requires a right hand [left hemisphere] adept at
technique and artifice.
(Bogen & Bogen, 1969, p. 200 ).
Ornstein and Galin (1976) and Dumas and Morgan (1975)
found no overall EEG differences between lawyers and engineers
on the one hand and artists, sculptors and ceramicists on the
other during performance of left and right hemispheric tasks.
Arndt and Berger (1978) found no differences in lateraliza
tion (as measured by discriminative reaction time to leftright hemisphere stimuli presentation) among graduate students
in sculpture, law, or psychology.

These negative findings

have been interpreted to contraindicate a relationship between
hemispheric specialization and creativity (e.g., Corballis,
1980), while in fact they merely confirm that creativity
cannot be explained in terms of simple hemispheric dominance.
Some evidence suggests that, even presuming a bilateral
contribution to the creative process, the pattern of hemis
pheric contributions may differ among artists and nonartists
in relevant task variables.

Recall the studies of Bever and

Chiarello (1974) and Davidson and Schwartz (1977), which
indicated greater left-hemispheric involvement in musical
tasks among musicians but greater right-hemispheric involve
ment in the same tasks among nonmusicians.
Figural complexity preference was associated with verbal
fluency in the studies of Barron (1953a).

A number of neuro

psychological studies of unilateral lesion patients have
established an association between left but not right frontal
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lobe damage and defects in verbal fluency.

" 'Dominant'

frontal lesions but not 'minor' frontal ones, interfere with
verbal processes, particularly in respect to spontaneity and
the ability to maintain a flow of verbal evocation, without
actually producing one of the typical aphasias" (Damasio,
1979, p. 383).

Zangwill (1976) found left frontal lesion

patients to perform particularly poorly on tests of divergent
thinking, a presumed measure of creativity which heavily
relies upon verbal fluency.

Possibly, the same neuropsycho

logical basis of the verbal fluency aspect of creativity
underlies figural complexity preference.
Martindale (1975) has proposed a cortical arousal model
of creativity.

He compared groups of "high- vs. low-

creatives" (based upon performance on the Remote Associates
and Alternate Uses Tests, two heavily verbal measures of
creativity) in terms of EEG alpha activity while resting
and while working on an "imaginative problem."

He found

that in the resting state, high creatives were more aroused
in both hemispheres; this generally aroused state (in com
parison to medium- and low-creative subject) was also
suggested by higher levels of skin conductance.
Highly creative people amplify sights, sounds, and
textures, the stimuli around them. They feel shock
and noise more intensely; they exaggerate sizes and
sensations. This over sensitivity is the subjective
counterpart of the physiological overactivity that
shows up in greater [bilateral] blocking on EEG
records.
(p. 48)
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Curiously, when engaged in imaginative task performance,
the opposite results were obtained.

High creatives then

operated at the lowest level of arousal (most alpha), al
though Martindale did not specify whether this effect was
unilateral or bilateral.

Martindale concludes from his

series of studies that "creative people view the world and
react to it unlike most of their peers do, not because they
are eccentric and strange, but because they process informa
tion differently" (p. 50).
The preceding sections have provided an overview of the
cognitive style, functional brain asymmetry and lateralitycognitive style literatures.

The following and concluding

section of this chapter will present the purposes and ob
jectives of the present study.

Purposes of the Present Study
Goldstein and Blackman (1978 ) concluded from their
extensive review of the cognitive style literature that
"studies designed to relate the variables used by one inves
tigator to those used by other investigators are needed"
(p. 4).

This constitutes one major purpose of the present

study:

to investigate the nature and degree of intercorre

lation of various dimensions of cognitive style.

Prior re

search establishes expectancy of certain relationships among
some subsets of cognitive style dimensions, as reviewed above.
For example, it is expected that the theoretically and
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methodologically similar dimensions of dogmatism, rigidity
and ambiguity intolerance will be significantly intercorrelated.

It is also expected that field indepencence will be

negatively correlated with impulsivity, but independent of
distractibility measures.

For many other combinations of

cognitive style dimensions, however, the lack of prior studies
does not permit empirically-based expected relationships.
Simple intercorrelation of the cognitive style variables,
as indicated by Goldstein and Blackman, is of interest in its
own right.

However, the second and larger purpose of the

present study is to explore the relationship between cogni
tive style and hemispheric function.

Since none of the

cognitive style tests utilized in the present study were
developed within a neuropsychological theoretical context,
there is little reason to predict an association between an
index of laterality and any particular, individual cognitive
style test, with the possible exception of field independence.
However, it is proposed that the assorted cognitive style
tests, when factor analyzed, will yield a fewer number of
broad cognitive style factors, which in turn may relate
meaningfully to a laterality index.

The notion of reducing

larger numbers of cognitive style test scores to a fewer
number of factor scores for purposes of theoretical clarifi
cation has precedent in the study of Mos, Wardell and Royce
(1974).

In this study, 26 variables for psychological differ

entiation and cognitive abilities yielded eight factors.

While
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the design of the Mos et al. study is similar in part to that
of the present study, its scope was restricted primarily to
investigation of relationships between perceptual differen
tiation a la Witkin and conceptual differentiation as defined
by Kagan.

The present study applies to a larger variety of

cognitive style test dimensions, and is an attempt to theore
tically relate hemispheric mode to some basic and general
cognitive style factors.

Since the study is exploratory in

nature, the precise nature of the cognitive style factors
cannot be anticipated.

Speculatively, however, such factors

may include general dimensions including complexity/differentiation, verbal distractibility, and flexibility.

Theoreti

cally, since the laterality index is scored in the direction
of right hemispheric preference, the first factor would be
expected to relate negatively, the second positively, and
the third either positively or negatively with extreme scores
on the laterality index.
The laterality index used in the present study is a
composite score, based upon three different measures of
laterality (LEM, ZEN, and W Q ) .

While each of these measures

has its shortcomings, as described previously, it is proposed
that the composite index may be a more reliable measure than
any of its individual components.
In addition to the cognitive style and laterality tests,
the present study also involves measures of left- and righthemispheric ability.

These are included in order to evaluate
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the cognitive dimensions in terms of the "ability vs. style"
distinction of Kogan (1976).

Additional measures of trait

anxiety, repression-sensitization, and social desirability
response bias are included in view of their potential rele
vance to interpretation of cognitive style factors and/or
the laterality index.
A description of the various tests used, the procedure
and the statistical analyses performed will be presented in
the following chapter.

CHAPTER THREE:

METHODOLOGY

Subjects
The subjects were 52 female and 45 male right-handed
undergraduate volunteers who received partial course credit
for their participation in the study.

Mean age of female

and male subjects was 20.25 (S.D. = 3.45) and 21.42 (S.D. =
3.0), respectively.

The predominantly white subject group

included one Native American female, one Native American
male, one black female and one black male.

While equal num

bers of males and females (n = 50) were sought according to
the original design of the study, an insufficient number of
male subjects was acquired despite vigorous recruitment
efforts.

Further contributing to the subsample size differ

ential was the fact that two additional male subjects only
partially completed the study and thus all of their data
were omitted from subsequent analyses.

All female subjects

provided complete and usable data.

Tests Administered
Subjects were administered a variety of laterality,
cognitive style and selected other tests.

The laterality

measures included the following:
Zenhausern Preference Test (ZEN).

The revised ZEN con

sists of 26 items which purport to assess visual vs. nonvisual
thinking style.

The forthright items require self-ratings by
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subjects on ten-point scales, with the rating poles varying
according to item content.

E.g., the poles associated with

the item, "How vivid are your daydreams," are "Not at all,"
and "Extremely," whereas self-rating for the item "Are you
fluent in using words," may vary from "Never" to "Always."
The raw ZEN score consists of the sum of right hemispheric
item ratings (15 items) less the sum of left hemispheric item
ratings (11 items).
Verbalizer-Visualizer Questionnaire (WQ ).

The W Q

(Richardson, 1977) consists of 15 True-False items distributed
among 15 "buffer" items.

Designed to identify habitual ver-

balizers and visualizers, it is scored in the direction of
visualizing tendency.

The critical items are highly similar

in content to ZEN items (e.g., "My dreams are extremely vivid").
Six of the keyed items are scored if marked "True," nine are
scored if marked "False."

Scores may range from 0 (extreme

verbalizer) to 15 (extreme visualizer).
Lateral Eye Movements (LEM).

Four research assistants

were trained in the administration of the LEM questionnaire
and in the observation and recording of responses.

The ques

tionnaire (see Appendix A) consisted of a balanced subset
of 20 items from those items originally used by Schwartz,
Davidson and Maer (1975).

Subjects were tested individually,

seated across a table (approximately
four examiners.
distractions.

2h

feet) from one of the

Experimental rooms were devoid of visual
After presentation of each item, examiners

covertly recorded direction of subject eye movements on a

76

form resembling the face of a clock.

Summary statistics were

computed by examiners and rechecked by the investigator after
the session.

Interscorer reliability of the assistants in

the scoring of nonlateral, right lateral and left lateral eye
movements of a sample subject in videotaped interview was
determined to be .96.
Assistants recorded the total number of nonlateral, right
and left LEMs for each subject.

The subsequent raw score

computed for the LEM measure consisted of the proportion of
left minus right lateral eye movements of all initial lateral
eye movements, in order to be consistent in interpretation
with the other laterality test scores.

That is, a higher

LEM score thus reflected more left-looking (presumably
greater right hemispheric activation); the ZEN and VVQ are
similarly scored in the direction of right hemispheric pre
ference.
To obtain a combined laterality score (LAT) for each
subject, scores on the component tests— ZEN, W Q , and LEM-were standardized by sex and then averaged.
Cognitive style tests utilized in the final data analysis
included eight group-administered and three individually
administered tests.

The group cognitive style tests in

cluded the following:
Group Embedded Figures Test (GEFT).

The GEFT (Witkin

et al., 1971) is a measure of field independence, or the
ability to perceive simple geometric figures set within an
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embedding context.

The examinee must retain the specified

one of eight simple figures (printed on the back of the test
booklet) in memory while examining the figure in which it is
embedded, although no constraints are imposed regarding the
number of times the simple figure may be re-examined.

The

examinee traces the outline of the specified simple figure
in its embedded context.

Two minutes are allowed for a prac

tice series of seven items.

Five minutes are allowed for each

of two subsequent nine-item test series.

The GEFT raw score

consists of the total number of 18 test items solved correctly
within the allotted time limit.

Thus a high score reflects

greater field independence or analytic ability.
Modified Role Construct Repertory Test (REP).

Bieri et

al. (1966) developed this modification of the Kelly REP test
(Kelly, 1955) to measure cognitive complexity.

The subject

rates each of 10 personally familiar people on 10 personality
dimensions, resulting in a grid of 100 numerical judgments
ranging from +3 to -3.

The rather complicated scoring pro

cedure, described in detail by Bieri et al. (1966), considers
the degree of redundancy of ratings within individuals rated
by the subject.

Higher scores indicate relatively differen

tiated intra-individual ratings (complexity), lower scores,
relatively undifferentiated ratings (simplicity).
Category Width Scale (CWS).

Developed by Pettigrew

(1958), the breadth of categorization test measures consis
tent individual preferences for broad inclusiveness vs.
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narrow exclusiveness in establishing an acceptable range for
specified categories.

On the CWS, the subject is given a

fictitious series of "average" values of various stimuli
and must select from multiple choices the presumed upper and
lower limits of the category.

For example, the examinee may

be given "the average width of windows" and be asked to esti
mate the width of "the widest window" and "the narrowest
window."

The multiple choices are keyed so that the broadest

limits (numerically farthest from the fictitious mean) re
ceive highest scores, the narrowest limits (closest to the
given mean), the lowest.

The keyed sum of all estimates is

total CWS score; thus, higher total scores indicate broader,
more inclusive categorization.
Object Sort (SORT).

The factor analytic study of Sloane

et al. (1963 ) revealed that all types of object sorting tasks,
including those using both actual objects and written names
of objects, loaded on a single factor.

Clayton and Jackson

(1961) developed two written object sort tasks, both of which
loaded as highly on the sorting factor of Sloane et al. as
did the actual object sort of Gardner et al. (1959).

Unfor

tunately, Clayton and Jackson did not publish their own
written lists of 50 objects to free-sort.

Therefore, for the

present study, a list of 50 objects was created which met
their specified criteria (see Appendix B).

The score is the

number of categories created by the examinee which included
at least two elements.
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Dogmatism (DOG), Ambiguity Tolerance (AMBIG) and Rigidity
(RIG).

The DOG scale requires subject ratings of degree of

agreement (-3 to +3) with 15 statements, e.g., "Most people
just don't know what's good for them."

For scoring, ratings

are transposed by addition of the constant +4, to values of
+1 to +7 (to avoid possible negative sums) and totalled.

The

AMBIG and RIG scales require True-False responses to similar
items.

The 20 AMBIG items are exemplified by, "It bothers

me when I don't know how other people react to me" (scored if
"false").

Fifteen of the AMBIG items are scored in the False

direction, five in the True direction.

The 22 RIG items are

all scored in the True direction and are of the type, "There
is usually only one best way to solve most problems."
Welsh Figure Preference Test (WFPT).

The WFPT (Welsh,

1980) consists of 400 black and white drawings varying in
complexity and abstractness.

The subject indicates whether

(s)he "likes" or "does not like" each figure.

While scores

may be determined for over 30 scales of this test, only two
empirical scales were utilized in the present study.

The

93-item Origence (WOR) scale, which is a refinement of the
earlier Barron-Welsh Art Scale (Barron, 1953a), is a measure
of figural complexity preference, while the 69-item Intellectance (WIN) scale measures degree of preference for abstract
geometric figures vs. concrete figures.

WIN has been inter

preted as a nonverbal measure of abstract attitude.

Theoreti

cally, the high WOR-low WIN pattern is consistent with a right
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hemispheric cognitive style and the low WOR-high WIN pattern,
with a left.

Thus the score selected to represent the WFPT

measure was the WOR-WIN difference score (WW).

High positive

or high negative WW scores would thus reflect the "purer"
types (imaginative vs. intellectual), whereas intermediate
scores would represent mixed, relatively nonlateralized styles.
Matching Familiar Figures Test (MFFT).
measure of reflection vs. impulsivity.

The MFFT is a

The adult form of

the MFFT requires the examinee to match a stimulus picture
(which remains in view) to its identical counterpart set
among seven other highly similar pictures.

If an incorrect

choice is made, the examinee is asked to continue guessing
until the correct alternative is identified.
derived from the MFFT:
(MF-T)

Two scores are

the average initial response latency

for 12 items, and total number of errors (MF-E).

Arithmetic Operations (AO).

The AO test is a measure

of one type of distractibility. The examinee must solve as
quickly as possible 24 simple arithmetic problems (e.g., "1 +
3 - 2 = ") surrounded by extraneous written material.

The

test is scored for both time required (AO-T) and the number
of errors (AO-E).
Stroop Color-Word Interference Test (STROOP). As a
Measure of a second type of distractibility, the STROOP
requires inhibition of conflicting verbal cues.

■

First, the

examinee reads aloud a list of 100 words as quickly as possi
ble (which consists of the recurring words "red," "blue," and
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"green," all typed in black ink and in irregular order).
Next, the examinee names aloud the "colors of the ink" of
100 sets of "X" marks, which are typed in red, blue and green
ink in irregular order.

The actual interference test is Part

3, in which the examinee must again name the "colors of the
ink," but must "ignore the words that are spelled" (see
Appendix C).

Interference is posed by the fact that the words

are names of colors incongruent with the ink-color with
which they are typed, e.g., the word "red" is typed in blue
ink.

Interference scores are obtained for both time required

to name the colors on Part 3 (ST-T) and total number of
errors on Part 3 (ST-E).
In addition to the laterality and cognitive style tests,
two tests of ability were included in the battery.

A group-

administered written form of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence
Scale Vocabulary subtest (VOC) (see Appendix D) (Wechsler,
1955) was constructed and used as an estimator of verbal (left
hemispheric) ability.

The Mooney Faces Test (MOON) (Mooney,

1957), also adapted for group testing (see Appendix E), served
as an estimator of right-hemispheric ability, as the Mooney
Test is regarded as a relatively pure measure of the ability
to synthesize visual information (cf. Benton, 1979).
Additional measures included in the battery because of
their possible relevance to laterality and cognitive style
test performance were the Spielberger Trait Anxiety Inventory
(ANX) (Spielberger, Gorsuch & Lushene, 1970), the MMPI
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controlled Repression-Sensitization scale (CRS) (Handal, 1973),
and the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (SD) (Crowne
& Marlowe, 1960).
A summary of all tests included in the battery and the
variables they purport to measure is given in Table 1.
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Table 1
The Test Battery
Laterality Tests
Zenhausern (ZEN)
Verbali zer-Visualizer
Questionnaire (WQ )
Lateral Eye Movements
(LEM)
Cognitive Style Tests
Group Embedded Figures
Test (GEFT)
Modified Role Construct
Repertory (REP)
Category Width Scale
(CWS )
Object Sort (SORT)
Dogmatism (DOG)
Ambiguity Tolerance
(AMBIG)
Rigidity (RIG)
Welsh Figure Prefer
ence Test OrigenceIntellectance (WW)
Matching Familiar Fig
ures Test (MFFT)
Arithmetic Operations
(AO )
Stroop Color-Word
Interference Test
(STROOP)
Ability Tests
WAIS Vocabulary (VOC)
Mooney Faces (MOON)
Additional Tests
Spielberger Trait
Anxiety (ANX)
Controlled RepressionSensitization (CRS)
Marlowe-Crowne Social
Desirability (SD)
i "r '
i

Measured Variable
visual (R)"1 vs. nonvisual (~L)1
thinking
visualizer (R) vs. verbalizer
(L)
left-looking (R) vs. right
looking (L)
field dependence (global) vs.
independence (analytic)
cognitive simplicity vs. com
plexity
broad vs. narrow categorization
conceptual differentiation
open- vs. closed-mindedness
ambiguity tolerance vs. in
tolerance
cognitive flexibility vs. rigidity
imaginative vs. intellectual
type
impulsivity vs. reflection
distractibility (Type A)
distractibility (Type B)

verbal (L) ability
visual synthesizing (R) ability
trait anxiety
repressor vs. sensitizer
social desirability response
bi as

refers to presumed right-hemispheric function, "L" to
left-hemispheric function
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Procedure
Data collection proceeded in three phases.

The first

was a large-scale group screening battery administered to
right-handed undergraduate volunteers for partial course
credit as part of an independent study.

The screening

battery consisted of the ANX, ZEN, SD and CRS scales, in that
order, and required approximately one-half hour of subject
time.

All students taking the screening battery were invited

at that time to volunteer for participation in the present
study for additional research credit.
and 20 female subjects were recruited.

In this way, one male
All other subjects

were recruited in conventional sign-up fashion, and these
students were administered the screening battery at the time
of the second data-gathering phase.
For the second phase, each participant was seen indivi
dually by appointment for approximately one hour.

Individual

sessions were conducted by one of four trained, advanced
undergraduate research assistants.

Initially, efforts were

made to counterbalance (1) number of subjects seen by each
assistant, (2) approximate time of day of testing by each
assistant, and (3) subject sex vs. assistant sex.

However,

these efforts were thwarted at an early stage due to gross
imbalances in assistant availability.

Assistant 1 (female)

tested 16 females and 18 males; Assistant 2 (female) tested
14 females and 14 males; Assistant 3 (male) tested 14 females
and 10 males; and Assistant 4 (male) tested 9 females and 3

85

males.

During the individual sessions, subjects were admin

istered the screening battery (ANX, ZEN, SD and CRS) if
necessary, LEM interview, AO, STROOP and MFFT, in that order.
All test introductions and directions were provided to assis
tants in written form to be read verbatim.

At the conclusion

of individual testing sessions, subjects were given reminder
slips specifying the location, date and time of their final
group testing session, which was scheduled at the same time
as individual sessions.
All but two (male) subjects who completed the individual
testing also completed the final group testing.

Altogether,

eight group sessions were held in order to accommodate stu
dents' schedules, the groups ranging in size from two to 25.
One female subject who failed to appear for one group session
and also a subsequently scheduled session did complete the
study when rescheduled a second time.

All group sessions

were conducted by the writer and each lasted approximately
three to three and one-half hours.

The order of group test

presentation was invariably as follows:

GEFT, MOON, W Q ,

VOC, REP, CWS, DOG, AMBIG, RIG, SORT and WFPT.

The first

two tests (GEFT and MOON) were timed tests; the remaining
tests were untimed and completed at the subjects' own pace.
Coffee and doughnuts were available to subjects during the
untimed portion of group sessions, and the taking of breaks
was encouraged as necessary.

The relaxed testing atmosphere

was intended to encourage optimal cooperation and to minimize
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fatigue.

In fact, very few subjects chose to take breaks

of more than a minute or two, or expressed feelings of fatigue
at the end of the extensive test battery.

Statistical Analyses
First, t-tests of the mean scores obtained by males and
females on all variables were computed in order to determine
whether subsequent analyses should be conducted separately
by sex.

Since sex differences on the laterality and cogni

tive style measures were minor (to be discussed below), sub
sequent analyses utilized pooled data (N = 97).
Next, first-order correlations were obtained for all
variables.
The third step of data analysis consisted of a series of
multiple regression analyses, utilizing cognitive style test
scores to predict the composite (LAT) and individual (ZEN,
VVQ, and LEM) laterality measures.

While prediction of the

composite LAT score was of primary interest according to the
design of the study, separate analyses of the LAT component
tests were deemed desirable due to low intercorrelations of
these measures.

These separate analyses were thus conducted

in order to determine whether the cognitive style tests re
lated in different ways to the various component measures
of the LAT index.

Also, it may be recalled that three of the

cognitive style tests (STROOP, AO, and MFFT) each yielded two
different scores, an error score and a time score.

The present
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series of analyses and all subsequent analyses were conducted
twice— first utilizing error-type cognitive style test scores
for those measures yielding dual scores, and secondly utili
zing time-type cognitive style test scores.

In summary, the

third step of data analysis consisted of a series of eight
multiple regression analyses:

prediction of LAT, ZEN, W Q ,

and LEM from cognitive style tests including error-type scores,
and the same predictions from cognitive style tests including
time-type scores.
The cognitive style test scores were then factor-analyzed
(principal axis method with oblique rotation).

The initial

factor analysis utilized squared multiple correlations of the
measures as prior communality estimates.

Subsequently, for

purposes of deriving factor scores, values of 1.0 were used as
prior communality estimates, thus taking into account the total
cognitive style test score variance.

Cognitive style factor

scores, of both error (CSF-E) and time (CSF-T) type, were
generated for each subject.

These cognitive style factor

scores, along with the ability and additional test scores
(VOC, MOON, ANX, CRS, and SD) were entered as independent
variables into a series of multiple regression equations,
with the laterality measures as the dependent variables.
These stepwise regression analyses revealed the degree of
laterality variance predicted by each variable as well as by
all variables combined.

Again, the analyses were conducted

separately for the composite (LAT) and individual (ZEN, W Q ,
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and LEM) laterality measures, and separately for the CSF-E
and CSF-T sets of scores, yielding a total of eight multiple
regression analyses.

CHAPTER FOUR:

RESULTS

Sex Differences
The t-test procedure revealed no sex differences on any
of the laterality measures (ZEN, W Q

and LEM), nor on the

combined LAT scores.
Of the 14 cognitive style tests, the mean scores of the
sexes did not significantly differ on 12 (GEFT, REP, DOG,
AMBIG, RIG, SORT, WW, AO-E, AO-T, MF-E, MF-T, or ST-E).

Sig

nificant mean sex differences were observed only on ST-T (t =
2.63, £ < .01), showing females to require less time than
males on the Stroop color-word interference task, and on
CWS (t = 2.53, £ < .01), indicating females to be narrower
categorizers than males on the Pettigrew limit-specification
task.
Males and females did not differ significantly in mean
scores on either of the ability measures (VOC or MOON).

Of

the additional measures (ANX, CRS, and SD), the sexes differed
significantly only on mean ANX scores (t = 1.97, £ < .05),
showing females to score higher than males on Spielberger
Trait Anxiety.

Intercorrelation of the Measures
The correlation matrix of all variables of the study is
shown in Table 2.
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Table 2
Correlation Matrix:
ZEN W Q
LAT

64d 74d 50d

26b

ZEN

--

35° -13

19

-01

WO

08

09

10

LEM

—

GEFT

14

18

04

03

03 -05

28b -11 -05

14

-10

-13

03

14

05

06

10

07

23a -03 -17

02

-01

-08

10

21a

11

13

02

12 -18

07

-10

00

00

-26b -03

—

15

08

09

-09

-01

-04

—

REP
CWS
AMBIG

AO-T

20a 1 9a

< .05
£
b < .01
£
c < .001
E
.0001
dE <

05

12

00

11

00 -04

18

07

06

-04

-26b

02

10

02 -34 C -08

-16

2 2a

07

13

-18

06

-04 --10

05

22a

10

-02

21a 11

12

04 -25

-14 -02 -15

21a 03

-02

17

00 -12

14

18

-02

03 -08

08

2 7 b-11

16

-16

-04

03

-02

09

09

13 --07

17

10

07

-02

17

03

01

__ .
-41d -06

03

-09

09

-04

09 -11

17
-16

-15

-12

05

14

-05

07

-15

-06

-22a

—

-19

-02
08

12

07

11

04 -30b -23a

07

-06

05

02 -09

13

-14

03

-01

01 -16

15

04

-07
--

a

05

01 -17

15

07

-36C 28b

01
-17

4 6d

SD

09 -22a

-24a
-04

-21a

04

—

MF-T

VOC

00

—

AO-E

WW

16

—

SORT

ST-E

04

—

RIG

ST-T

02 -07

—

DOG

MF-E

All Variables'1'

LEM GEFT REP CWS DOG AMBIG RIG SORT AO-T AO-E MF-T MF-E ST-T ST-E WW .VOC MOON ANX CRS

21a 06 -35C -22a

00 -14

26

30b 07
10

03 -01

04
21'

12

00

-08

03 -15

08

09

-54d
—

09

-05 --07 -03

05

07 -07 -03

19

26b 07 -16

-12

38d --02 -18

-21a -0 9

—

MOON
ANX
CRS
^Decimal points are assumed but not shown in the correlation coefficients.

_

08

24b 13
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02

17

15 -21a -2 4a 2 2 'a 19 -04
— -28b -08
30 D 00 -08
—
26 b -10 -24b-32
—

-01 -25b 05
—

-24b -12
—

-22'
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o
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The high correlations of LAT with ZEN (r = .64), W Q

(r

= .74) and LEM (r = .50), all significant at the .0001 level,
were to be expected since LAT was derived from scores on these
measures.

LAT correlations with individual cognitive style

test scores were nonsignificant, with the exceptions of GEFT
(r = .26, p < .01) and MF-E (r = -.24, p < .05).

Thus a

right-hemispheric style, operationally defined in terms of
LAT score, is associated with a more field independent per
ceptual style (ability to perceptually overcome an embedding
context) and with fewer errors on the MFFT (ability to iden
tify identical pictorial stimuli under time pressure).

LAT

correlates negatively with verbal ability as measured by VOC
(r = -.22, p < .05) but is apparently unrelated to visual
synthesizing ability (MOON).

LAT correlations with the addi

tional measures (ANX, CRS and SD) were all nonsignificant.
The individual laterality tests correlated with cognitive
style measures in unique and inconsistent patterns (see Table
2).

None of the individual laterality measures, nor the

composite LAT score, correlated significantly with seven
(REP, CWS, DOG, AO-E, MF-T, ST-E, WW) of the 14 cognitive
style variables, with the MOON ability measure, or with trait
anxiety.
The strongest intercorrelations among the individual
cognitive style measures were between time and error scores
on the MFFT (r = -.54, p < .0001), time and error scores on
the STROOP (r = .38, p < .0001), AO time and STROOP time (r =
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.46, £ < .001), Ambiguity Tolerance and Rigidity (r = -.41,
£ < .0001), and Ambiguity Tolerance and Dogmatism (r = -.36,
£ < .0 0 1 ).

Multiple Regression Analysis:

LAT x Individual Cognitive

Style Measures
Using first that set of cognitive style test scores which
included error scores of the STROOP, AO and MFFT, stepwise
regression analysis revealed that GEFT alone accounted for
about 7 % of total LAT variance, that GEFT and MF-E jointly
accounted for 10.5% of LAT variance, and that the best 11variable model found accounted for about 23% of total LAT
variance.

Using the cognitive style test scores which in

cluded ST-T, AO-T, and MF-T instead of ST-E, AO-E, and MF-E
as independent variables, the order of entry of the variables
after GEFT varied, and the best 11-variable model accounted
for only about 18% of total LAT variance.

Multiple Regression Analyses;

Individual Laterality Measures

x Individual Cognitive Style Measures
The order of entry of individual cognitive style variables
in multiple regression equations to predict individual later
ality measures was highly inconsistent, and total proportions
of variances explained were limited.

Eleven-variable pre

dictions of ZEN accounted for only 12% and 14% of ZEN variance,
respectively, utilizing cognitive style tests yielding error
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and time scores.

For LEM, the corresponding proportions of

explained variance were 21% and 20%; for W Q , 25% and 15%.
The patterns of relative contributions of the independent
variables in the regression equations for individual later
ality measures were dissimilar to those for the composite
laterality index, with the exception that GEFT was weighted
most heavily in the prediction of LEM, just as for LAT.

Factor Analyses;

Cognitive Style Test Scores

An initial factor analysis (principal axis method), using
squared multiple correlations as prior communality estimates,
yielded only one cognitive style factor with an eigenvalue
greater than 1.0.

This factor was defined primarily by the

Dogmatism, Rigidity, and Ambiguity Tolerance measures, all
with factor loadings in the 50's and accounting for about 10%
of the variance.

The appearance of only one factor by this

method was attributed to the low intercorrelations of indivi
dual cognitive style tests.

Thus for subsequent factor anal

yses and derivation of factor scores, values of 1.0 were taken
as initial communality estimates, thereby taking into account
total cognitive style test score variance as opposed to the
more limited shared variance (squared multiple correlations)
of these measures.
Using unity, then, as initial communality estimates,
the factor analysis of cognitive style tests including error
scores yielded five factors with eigenvalues greater than
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1.0.

The factor analysis of cognitive style tests including

time scores also yielded five factors.

The matrices of

factor loadings after oblique rotation (the factor structure
matrices) for both sets of cognitive style tests are given
in Table 3.
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Table 3
Cognitive Style Factor Loadings

Variables

Factors
KE)1 I (T)2 II(E) II (T) III(E) Ill(T) IV(E) IV(T) V(E) V (T)

GEFT
REP
CWS
DOG
AMBIG
RIG
SORT
WW

-.19
-.05
.11
.70
-.79
.74
.15
-.12

AO-E
MF-E
ST-E
AO-T
MF -T
ST-T

-.36
.19 .09
-.05
.85
.04
.04
.28 -.06
.73
.10
.14
-.76
.12
.16
.71 -.13 -.16
.17
.21 -.18
-.03
.30
.04
.05
.17
.18
-.48 —
.11
.01
—
-.10
.87
—
—
-.12
.21
—
—
-.05
.80
—

—

—

—

—

—

.18
.04
.76
-.15
-.10
.00
-.66
-.28
.10
.34
.17
—
—
—

-.03 -.70
.36 -.28
.43
.05
.53
.11
-.06 -.04
.84
.01
.20
.32 -.05
.14
.00 -.10 -.03
.03
.01 -.07
-.29
.11
.01 -.34 -.08
.60
-.10
.20 -.12
.58
.78
-.12
.38
.59

-. 31
.63
-.06
.21
.20
-.05
-.01
.81

—

—

—

—

—

—

-.09
.05 —
.78 —
.09

—

—

—

-.10
.14
.10

.75
—
—
—

(E) - Set of cognitive style test scores including error
(not time) scores on three measures.
(T) = Set of cognitive style test scores including time
(not error) scores on three measures.

—

.17
.04
-.09
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Factor I of both sets of cognitive style test scores
was defined by the DOG, AMBIG, and RIG measures, all with
loadings in the .70's, and thus appeared to be an "Open vs.
Closed-Mindedness" factor.

It accounted for approximately

16% of total variance of both types of cognitive style test
scores.
Factor II differed for the cognitive style tests including
error (E) scores versus those including time (T) scores.

For

the first group, Factor II was defined primarily by REP (fac
tor loading .85), but a moderate negative loading of MF-E
(-.48) also appeared on this factor.

Based upon its most

substantial contributor, however, this factor was called
"Verbal Complexity vs. Simplicity."

Factor II of the second

(T) set of cognitive style tests was clearly defined by time
scores on both of the distractibility tests (AO-T, loading
.87; ST-T, loading .80) and was thus easily interpretable
as a "Distractibility vs. Nondistractibility" factor.
Factor III of the first (E) type of cognitive style
tests appeared to be an "Inclusive vs. Exclusive Categorizing"
factor.

For this factor, positive loading of CWS (.76),

indicative of broader, more inclusive limit-setting on the
Category Width Scale, was associated with negative loading
of SORT (-.66), which reflects fewer categories created (and
thus more inclusive groupings) in the free-sort task.

Con

versely, more conservative, exclusive, or narrower CWS cate
gorizing was associated with more numerous (and hence
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exclusive) categories created on the SORT task.

Factor III

of the second (T) group of cognitive style tests was less
easily interpretable, being defined primarily by positive
loadings on both MF-T (.78) and SORT (.60).

Longer response

latencies on the figure-matching task were thus associated
with more exclusive SORT groupings (larger numbers of cate
gories created).

This factor thus combined elements of

reflectiveness in task approach, and a discriminating approach
to conceptual groupings.

It was unrelated, however, to re

sponse latency on the other two timed tasks, AO and STROOP,
and so the type of reflectiveness involved did not appear to
be due to distractibility.

Therefore, to avoid any connota

tions of distractibility, this factor was called "Reflective
Discrimination vs. Impulsive Nondiscrimination."

This inter

pretation was supported by a moderately positive loading of
REP on this factor.

Greater complexity in ratings of people

(less redundancy of ratings, or more differentiated percep
tions of others) was thus associated with the "reflective
discrimination" pole of this factor.

Conversely, more global

and relatively undifferentiated perceptions of other people
were associated with the "impulsive nondiscrimination" pole.
GEFT and AO-E defined Factor IV of the first cognitive
style test group, with loadings of -.70 and .78, respectively.
This factor thus associated low GEFT accuracy with more AO
errors, and high GEFT accuracy with fewer AO errors.

Ability

to overcome embedding contexts has been theoretically and
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empirically distinguished from ability to overcome distracting
contexts in the past, and GEFT accuracy was unrelated to
either AO-T or ST-T on Factor II(T).

Thus the relationship

apparent in the present factor did not appear to be attribu
table to distractibility.

Possibly, Factor IV(E) tapped

instead a common underlying non-perceptual ability dimension,
which may indeed be the very ability factor that tends to
occasionally contaminate the "purely perceptual" GEFT per
formance.

This ability factor may also partially confound

the AO test, even though the AO items were deliberately con
structed to be quite simple and designedly thus unaffected
by numerical ability.

An appropriate name for this hypo

thesized common underlying ability factor was elusive, but
it was tentatively designated "Numerical-Analytic Ability"
in order to most closely reflect its constituent tests.

For

this factor, only one pole was named, because as an ability
measure, it is presumed to be a "more-or-less" variable as
opposed to a qualitative continuum.
Factor IV of the second (T) group of cognitive style
tests was unique and interpretively complex.

CWS had the

highest loading (.84) on this factor, followed by REP (.53),
with modest contributions by GEFT (.36) and SORT (-.34).

It

was partially reminiscent of Factor III(E), which also had
positive CWS and negative SORT loadings.

However, REP and

GEFT were noncontributory to that factor (which had been
called "Inclusive vs. Exclusive Categorizing").

Therefore,
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in addition to the inclusive-exclusive dimension, the present
factor also contained elements of cognitive complexity and
perceptual field independence, both of which were associated,
curiously, with the inclusive direction of this factor.

The

interpretive dilemma was not resolved by limiting considera
tion to only those tests, CWS and REP, with the highest
factor loadings.

Simultaneous positive loadings on these

measures is both contraintuitive and contratheoretical.

Why

should a broader, more inclusive limit-setter on the Category
Width Test also manifest more complex and discriminating
interpersonal judgments?

This curious factor was finally

named after the single variable of highest loading (CWS),
viz., "Broad vs. Narrow Bandwidth."

The "bandwidth" term

was chosen vs. "categorization" in order to avoid confusion
with Factor III(E), and to emphasize that it applies pri
marily to the CWS variety of category formation, without
generality to the REP task (except paradoxically).
Factor V(E) was primarily defined by the Stroop error
score (.75), with moderate additional loadings of MF-E (.59)
and WW (.58).

This pattern was descriptive of a type of

impulsivity or distractibility associated with preference for
figural complexity and dislike of simple geometrical forms
when a more "interesting" alternative visual stimulus was
available.

The contribution of WW, probably the purest

stylistic preference (vs. ability) measure in the battery,
suggested that the Stroop and MFFT errors made by individuals
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scoring high on this factor were of a qualitatively different
type than those scoring low on the "Numerical-Analytical
Ability" Factor, or high on the "Distractibility" Factor.
Arithmetic Operations Test error scores were in fact slightly
negatively loaded on this factor.

The type of errors asso

ciated with high Factor V(E) scores, then, were evident on
tasks requiring oral or pointing (but not written) responses.
Considered in conjunction with the contribution of WW, this
factor was therefore interpreted to reflect a type of spon
taneity, noncritical in certain task situations, with its
polar opposite being a critical reflectiveness also associated
with preference for figural order, simplicity, and symmetry.
Factor V(E) was named "Noncritical Spontaneity vs. Critical
Reserve."
Finally, the highest loadings on Factor V(T) were those
of WW (.81) and REP (.63).

This factor appeared to combine

two different types of cognitive complexity:

preference for

figural or nonverbal complexity, and complexity in inter
personal perception.

High Factor V(T) scorers would thus

both prefer and impose more differentiated cognitive-percep
tual stimulus arrays; low scorers would prefer and impose
more simplified and generalized cognitive-perceptions.

In

order to emphasize the application of this factor to both
verbal and nonverbal domains, it was named "Cognitive-Per
ceptual Complexity vs. Simplicity," to distinguish it from
Factor 11(E), which applied only to the verbal cognitive domain.
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A summary of the ten factors extracted in this series of
analyses is presented in Table 4.

Table 4
Cognitive Style Factors Types E and T
Type
Factor
I

E

T

Open vs. ClosedMindedness
AMBIG
-.79
RIG
.74
DOG
.70

Open vs. ClosedMindedness
AMBIG
-.76
DOG
.73
RIG
.71

II

Verbal Complexity vs.
Simplicity
REP
.85
(MF-E
-.48)

Distractibility vs.
Nondistractibility
AO-T
.87
ST-T
.08

III

Inclusive vs. Exclusive
Categorizing

Reflective Discrimina
tion vs. Impulsive
Nondiscrimination
MF-T
.78
SORT
.60
REP
.43

CWS
SORT

IV

V

.76
-.66

Numerical-Analytical
Ability
AO-E
.78
GEFT
-.70
Noncritical Spontaneity
vs. Critical Reserve
ST-E
MF-E
WW

.75
.59
.58

Broad vs. Narrow Band
width
CWS
.84
(REP
.53)
Cognitive-Perceptual
Complexity vs.
Simplicity
WW
.81
REP
.63
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Multiple Regression Analyses:

LAT x Cognitive Style Factors

and Additional Measures
Using the error-type cognitive style test factor scores
(CSF-E), as well as the ability and selected additional test
scores (VOC, MOON, ANX, SD, and CRS), the best three-variable
model found to predict the composite LAT score included VOC,
CSF-E Factor 4 (Numerical-Analytical Ability),

and CSF-E Factor

2 (Verbal Complexity vs. Simplicity), in that order.

In

combination, these variables accounted for approximately 13%
of LAT variance, and the inclusion of all ten variables in
creased this explained variance to only about 18%.
The corresponding regression analysis using CSF-T factors
and additional measures as independent variables resulted in
a ten-variable model which accounted for only 12% of LAT
variance.

The variables included in the best three-variable

model were VOC, CSF-T Factor 2 (Distractibility vs. Nondistractibility), and MOON, which jointly accounted for about
8% of LAT variance.

Multiple Regression Analyses:

Individual Laterality Measures

x Cognitive Style Factors and Additional Measures
Multiple prediction of the individual laterality measures
from cognitive style factors and additional test scores
accounted for 11% to 25% of respective laterality variances.
Prediction from both

error and time

types of cognitive

style factors was poorest for the ZEN measure, with total
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explained ZEN variance being 11% and 12%, respectively.
best prediction was of W Q

The

(25%), from CSF-E factor scores

and additional measures, with the best three-variable solu
tion including VOC, CSF-E Factor 2 (Verbal Complexity vs.
Simplicity), and CSF-E Factor 5 (Noncritical Spontaneity vs.
Critical Reserve).

In the multiple regression equation for

W Q , VOC was negatively weighted, and the factors are weighted
in the directions of verbal complexity and critical reserve.

CHAPTER FIVE:

DISCUSSION

In the following discussion, obtained intercorrelations
of the individual measures will first be considered, and
compared with results of previous studies where applicable.
Next, sex differences will be addressed.

Finally, the cog

nitive style factors and their relation to the laterality
index will be discussed, with consideration of some general
procedural and theoretical issues and implications for future
research.
Dogmatism, rigidity, and ambiguity tolerance all corre
lated significantly with each other, at the .01 level or
better, as expected on the basis of previous studies.

In

fact, the obtained correlation coefficient of -.41 (p < .0001)
between rigidity and ambiguity tolerance is of precisely the
same magnitude as that reported by MacDonald (1970).

While

these three tests were clearly related to each other, none
of them correlated significantly with any other cognitive
style variable, with the exception of rigidity, which was
related to MFFT time score (r = -.22, |D < .05).

Higher

rigidity scores were thus associated with greater impulsivity, at least in terms of response latency (but not in
terms of errors).

With regard to the ability measures, only

dogmatism showed any significant relationship, and this rela
tionship was negative with both verbal and nonverbal ability.
DOG, RIG, and AMBIG were all unrelated to trait anxiety, but
104
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both DOG and RIG were significantly related to sensitizing
on the CRS scale.

Dogmatism has previously been related to

sensitizing (Vacchiano et al., 1969), so this finding is
consistent with the literature.

Also consistent, even though

somewhat surprising, is an apparent lack of relationship
between dogmatism and social desirability.

High-dogmatics

have been clearly shown to be a conventional, conservative,
conforming type, unusually dependent upon authority figures
and perceived environmental expectations, in a variety of
tasks and settings.

Of all the cognitive style variables

in the battery, in fact, dogmatism might be expected to re
late most clearly to a social desirability response bias on
rational, if not empirical, grounds.

Yet, not only was this

relationship not evident, but ambiguity tolerance correlated
positively with social desirability (r = .26, p < .01) in
the present sample, contrary to the findings of MacDonald
(1970).

Apparently, high-dogmatics "believe what they be

lieve" regardless of the social desirability of doing so,
whereas those who profess tolerance of uncertainties, alter
native views, challenging problems without clearcut answers,
and so forth, may in fact be doing so partly because of an
expectation that this is socially desirable behavior.

Alter

natively, genuinely ambiguity tolerant individuals may be
"right-brained," visual thinkers (AMBIG was the only cogni
tive style variable to significantly correlate, positively,
with the ZEN), whose higher social desirability scores may

106

be interpreted as "image-polishing," in the terms of Bear and
Fedio (1977) .
The Origence-Intellectance (WW) cognitive style variable
related to some other variables in the battery in expected
or plausible ways.

The so-called "imaginative type" of indi

vidual, defined by figural complexity preference and avoidance
of regular, geometric designs, also demonstrates a complex
(differentiated) personal constructs system, as measured by
the REP.

In fact, WW was the only cognitive style variable

to significantly correlate with REP.

Although it may not be

surprising to observe a relationship between cognitive com
plexity and complexity preference, it is interesting that
this "complexity" dimension applies to a certain extent to
both verbal and nonverbal modes.

WW was also significantly

negatively correlated with the verbal IQ estimator (VOC),
which is consistent with Welsh's (1980) claim that the high
WOR-low WIN type does worst on traditional IQ measures,
whereas the opposite type does best.

Higher WW scores were

also associated with higher trait anxiety, which is consis
tent with the literature involving the Barron-Welsh Art Scale
(BWAS).

Welsh (1980) had reported "breakdown of repression"

and sensitizing tendencies associated with this scale, and the
writer (Note 1) had found a significant positive relation
ship between the BWAS and Spielberger trait anxiety.

Simi

larly, the EEG studies of Martindale (1975) had indicated
relatively high bilateral arousal among "high creatives"
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in the resting state, and various other manifestations con
gruent with sensitization and/or trait anxiety.

Thus the

significant correlations of WW with other variables in the
study were sensible; the more perplexing findings in regard
to WW were the absence of certain expected relationships.
From the foregoing discussion, one such expected relationship
was obviously with sensitizing tendency on the CRS scale.
This was nonexistent (r = .00).

Other expected relationships

were with impulsivity (positive) and dogmatism (negative),
based upon Welsh's review of the BWAS, and with rigidity
(negative), based upon the writer's preliminary study noted
above.

Possibly, these effects were attenuated due to the

contribution of WIN subscale performance, instead of heightened,
as proposed by Welsh.
Due to the substantial accumulated literature regarding
field independence, a number of relationships could be anti
cipated.

Generally, however, only the expected "non-rela

tionships," as opposed to positive or negative ones, were
borne out in the present study.

Specifically, field indepen

dence was expected to be independent of the SORT measure (as
per Gardner et al., 1959), and of dogmatism, rigidity, and
ambiguity tolerance (Goldstein & Blackman, 1978; Messick &
Fritzky, 1963).

These variables were indeed unrelated to

GEFT in the present study.

However, field independence could

be expected to correlate negatively with impulsivity, STROOP
interference score, and possibly the Mooney Faces test (cf.
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Kogan, 1 9 7 1 ), and positively with cognitive complexity (per
Witkin's "psychological differentiation" theory).
these relationships were apparent.

None of

The only variables with

which GEFT correlated significantly in the present study
were the Verbal IQ estimator (r = .2 2 , £ < .0 5 ) and Arith
metic Operations errors (r = - . 2 6 , £ < .0 1 ).

This finding

was obtained even though VOC and AO-E were unrelated to each
other.

While Witkin maintains that field independence is

independent of verbal intelligence, this assertion has not
always been supported in the past (cf. Kogan, 1 9 7 3 ; Wachtel,
1 9 6 8 ) and it is not supported in the present study.

That

field independence is associated with fewer errors on the
distractibility task also calls into question Karp's (1 9 6 3 )
claim that ability to extract relevant information from an
embedding context is independent of the same skill in a
distracting context.

Furthermore, Karp had reported fac

torial independence of the Arithmetic Operations test and
WAIS Vocabulary, but in the present study, the AO time score
was correlated (negatively) with both ability measures.
Thus, lower verbal and visual synthesizing ability scores
were associated with longer time required to perform the AO
distraction test, and more errors on the embedded figures
test; and more GEFT errors were also associated with more
AO errors.

The rather low (but significant) pattern of

obtained intercorrelations would support the notion that
GEFT field independence and AO freedom from distractibility
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are related but not identical abilities, that neither of them
are completely independent of verbal intellectual ability,
and that AO distractibility is also related in part to lower
visual synthesizing ability.
What of the other type of distractibility, the type
measured by the Stroop test?

Previous factorial studies had

suggested that the STROOP and AO tests tap different cogni
tive domains.

But in the present study, both STROOP time and

error scores were significantly related to AO time (but not
AO error) scores.

In fact, the correlation between STROOP

time and AO time (r = .46, £ < .0001) was the strongest
observed interrelationship between any pair of different
cognitive style tests.

Individuals who require more time on

the color-word interference test (and who make more errors
in the process ) also tend to require more time to solve simple
arithmetic problems in a highly distracting context.

The in

dependence of these two types of distractibility is thus
questionable.

Also, Stroop time and errors appear to be

negatively related to both verbal and visual synthesizing
ability (three of the four correlations involved were signi
ficant).

Perhaps the most surprising finding with the STROOP,

however, was its apparent lack of relationship to field inde
pendence.

Gardner et al. (1959) had found more field dependent

subjects to be more susceptible to Stroop interference, at
least among females (the obtained correlation of .21 for
males in that study was nonsignificant with consideration of
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sample size).

The failure to replicate this finding with the

present sample is all the more puzzling due to observed asso
ciations between the STROOP and AO, AO and GEFT , and between
all three of these measures with the ability measures.

Given

these, we would also expect a STROOP relationship with GEFT.
But this relationship was very nearly zero.

Apparently, the

facility to inhibit a verbal cue (as required by the STROOP)
bears some relationship to speed and accuracy in extracting
and working with numerical information (the AO), inhibiting
extraneous material, but it is unrelated to perceptual analy
sis, requiring the disembedding of a geometric figure.

The

difference may thus possibly be explained in terms of task
content (verbal/numerical vs. visuospatial) or in terms of
the primary task demand (inhibition vs. active analysis).
Expected relationships involving the reflection-impulsivity (MFFT) test were highly tentative, since the relevant
prior studies had all been done with children.

Reflective

children had been found to be more field independent, with
MFFT time scores relating positively to EFT accuracy and
MFFT error scores relating negatively to EFT accuracy.

With

the present sample of college students, these relationships
were not apparent.

Correlations of MF-T and MF-E with the

GEFT were nonsignificant.

We are reminded of Wachtel's (1968)

distinction between style and capacity, especially as this
relates to child-adult differences in analytic functioning.
While Wachtel had confined his discussion to analytic ability

Ill
(field independence) vs. analytic style (as measured by a
sorting task), finding these to be related in children but
not necessarily in adults, his reasoning may be applicable
to the current topic.

That is, a reflective task approach

may well be an ability or capacity dimension in children,
thus related positively to EFT accuracy.

But in adults,

reflection-impulsivity (or "cognitive tempo") may represent
more of a stylistic dimension, not necessarily related to
GEFT ability.

This interpretation is supported by the ob

servation that while the GEFT positively correlates with the
verbal ability measure even in adults, the MFFT bears no
relation to either ability measure.
Not surprisingly, longer initial response latencies on
the MFFT were clearly and negatively related to MFFT errors
(r = -.54, p < .0001).

MFFT errors were also positively

associated with STROOP errors (r = .26, £ < .01).

Of some

what greater interest, longer MFFT response latencies also
correlated with lower Rigidity scores (r = -.22, £ < .05).
A reflective task approach thus appears associated to some
degree with greater cognitive flexibility.

The previous

speculation, that reflectiveness may represent more of a
stylistic than an ability dimension in adults, is indirectly
supported by its association with rigidity, which also was
unrelated to either ability measure in the present study.
The conceptual differentiation (SORT), category width
(CWS), and cognitive complexity (REP) measures yielded the

112

most disappointing results of the study, with the exception
of the REP relationship to figural complexity preference
discussed earlier.

These three dimensions did not show any

relationship to each other or to any other variable in the
study, except for weak relations between SORT and the W Q

(r

= .19, £ < .05) and between CWS and AO-T (r = -.21, £ < .05).
These isolated relationships make little theoretical sense
and may easily be chance findings.

The large number (39) of

potential significant intercorrelations of these measures
with each other and with other cognitive style variables could
have provided an excellent basis for emergence of an antici
pated "complexity-differentiation" cognitive style factor.
Therefore, while the apparent independence of these dimensions
in 37 of 39 of these comparisons is impressive in its own
right, this very independence substantially doomed hope of
extracting a cognitive style factor of this type.
Of the cognitive style variables, findings of some prior
studies led to expectation of sex differences on the GEFT
(males more field independent), and the MFFT (females more
reflective).

In the present sample, the mean scores of males

and females did not significantly differ on either of these
measures.

Also, the occasionally reported superior vocabulary

scores of females were not evident in the present study.
Despite prior findings of higher quantitative facility among
males than females, the sexes in the present study did not
differ in performance on the distraction task involving
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numerical content.

The sexes did differ on the CWS, as re

ported in prior studies, with females manifesting narrower
categorization.

Females also obtained significantly higher

trait anxiety scores.

Despite these isolated observed

differences, the more prominent findings of the present
study in regard to sex differences were (1) absence of several
expected differences, and (2) the large number of no observed
sex differences.

These findings support the observation of

Kogan (1976), and more recently, of Hyde (1981), that sexrelated cognitive differences may typically be overstated
in the literature and may even be declining over time.

The

implication of such findings and observations, is not that
investigators should fail to seek sex differences, or to re
port or control for them when observed, but rather that they
not be inappropriately exaggerated, assumed, or otherwise
utilized in ways which serve to foster sexual discrimination
in real-life settings such as school guidance or career
counseling (cf. Hyde, 1981).

Such implications and appli

cations go "far beyond the data."
The cognitive style factors extracted in the current
study accounted for very little more of the total cognitive
style test variance than did any single cognitive style test
score.

This is not surprising, in view of the low inter

correlations of individual cognitive style tests.

The first

and largest factor (and the only one with an eigenvalue
greater than 1.0 in the factor analysis using squared multiple
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correlations as initial communality estimates), was an "open
vs. closed-mindedness" factor defined by Dogmatism, Rigidity,
and Ambiguity Tolerance, which demonstrated the most consis
tent individual intercorrelations.

Additional factors,

generated by the factor analytic procedure in which total
cognitive style test variance instead of shared variance was
considered, were different depending upon whether time or
error scores were used for those tests which yielded both
types of scores.

Other than the tests which loaded on Factor

1 (DOG, RIG, and AMBIG), even those tests which did not yield
dual scores did not load on comparable factors in the second
series of factor analyses.

Thus, it would appear that only

Open vs. Closed-Mindedness is a factor which emerges reliably,
regardless of the method used.

However, it should be recalled

that even this reliable first factor only accounted for up to
7% more total variance (depending upon the type of factor
analytic method used) than any of its individual component
tests, so that its theoretical as well as practical signi
ficance is very limited.
Similarly, the multiple regression analyses revealed
that a relatively small amount of laterality test variance
was predictable from cognitive style tests, cognitive style
factors, and additional measures.

Unexplained composite

LAT variance ranged from 77% to 88% with maximum R^ predic
tion; unexplained individual laterality test variance ranged
from 75% to 89%.

Furthermore, the patterns of relative
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contributions of independent variables in these analyses were
inconsistent, among individual laterality tests and between
individual and composite laterality measures.
Generally, we might draw conclusions from the present
study similar to those of Gardner et al. (1959), from theirs:
Perhaps the most salient new finding of the present
study is that these control principles are indepen
dent of each other . . . This is an important finding.
It implies that it is necessary to sample the various
controls in a person's cognitive behavior if we are
to understand his "cognitive style." This is parti
cularly true since even the simplest-appearing adap
tive behaviors may involve more than one cognitive
factor.
(pp. 137-138)
While the inclination to simplify and to generalize, and to
infer some cognitive characteristics of people on the basis
of others, is both natural in everyday interaction and a goal
of scientific psychological theory, studies such as the current
one should loudly caution against such inclinations.

We

might, as suggested by Gardner, confine our inquiries to a
"variable by variable" assessment of an individual's multi
dimensional cognitive style, predicting with confidence only
from a mosaic cognitive style profile, which in a way repre
sents an abandonment of the search for higher-order, unifying
theoretical principles.
Or, we might conclude, like Corballis (1980), that the
search for unifying principles of cognitive style is not
unreasonable or unrealistic; but that the neuropsychological
model itself is inadequate to the task:
My quarrel is not with the classification of cognitive
styles that has been grafted onto the left-right axis.
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It is perfectly acceptable to contrast intuition
with reason, the holistic with the analytic, the
appositional with the propositional . . . What I
am objecting to is the simplistic notion that
these contrasting cognitive styles are identified
with the two cerebral hemispheres.
(p. 288)
The major problem with Corballis' argument, however, is that
until only about twenty years ago, differential hemispheric
capabilities other than localization of speech and language
function were unknown.

Before that, the idea that the right

hemisphere can perceive and copy geometric figures while the
left, in isolation, cannot, that objects presented to the
right hemisphere could be correctly identified nonverbally
while the left hemisphere concurrently verbally denies their
very existence, would also have seemed incredible and perhaps
simplistic.

Yet this is well-documented fact, and the impli

cations of these and other differential functions have only
begun to be explored.

To reject the relevance of these

structural and functional differences to cognitive style—
information processing in the normal brain— seems premature
at best.

The two brain hemispheres do appear to process

different information, in different ways, and that is what
the construct of "cognitive style" is all about.
We would agree with Corballis that over-hasty, sweeping
inferences about left-right hemispheric differences in
everyday behavior are also premature and inappropriate.

As

Ley (1979) has noted, "The behavioral manifestations of
functional cerebral asymmetries in man embody a current
psychological Zeitgeist" (p. 41).

"Split-brain psychology"
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has indeed been dubbed the "fad of the year" (Goleman, 1977).
Articles abound in the popular press (e.g., Loch, 1981;
Raudsepp, 1981) which grossly exaggerate known behavioral
correlates of left vs. right hemispheric function.

Such

exaggerations and distortions are naturally an affront to
serious investigators and do little but provide "bad press"
for neuropsychological models of behavior.

They are reminis

cent of the explosion of speculative material and applications
which followed introduction of psychoanalytic concepts early
in the present century.

However, just as "popular analysis"

is irrelevant to the validity or invalidity of psychoanalytic
theory, popular notions of "hemisphericity" in all areas of
life and civilization need not and should not detract from
or discourage scientific investigation of the laterality
model.
The present study does offer implications for future re
search in this area.

For one, the observed intercorrelations

among the three "laterality" measures were very low, suggesting
the need for improvement of the measurement of laterality in
nonclinical settings.

The LEM measure did not correlate

significantly with either the ZEN or the W Q , so that it is
doubtful that the LAT index was much more than self-reported
visual, modality preference.

While this preference may even

tually prove to be related to a degree to a right-hemispheric
processing style, it is probably not identical with it.

Thus

one major implication of the study is that more sophisticated

118

measures of laterality in normal subjects need to be developed.
Secondly, the "cognitive style variables" of the present study
were a potpourri of tests, many apparently measures of ability
as opposed to style, developed within various theoretical
frameworks.

It would seem that, to assess cognitive style

from a neuropsychological viewpoint, measures of dimensions
of cognitive style must be developed which are based soundly
upon neuropsychological research.

Validation of these measures

against real-life problem-solving strategies would follow.
The present study has offered evidence that several
existing "laterality" measures are largely unrelated to a
number of traditional cognitive style measures.

The cogni

tive style dimensions in turn were found to be largely inde
pendent of each other, indicating that individuals manifest
considerable diversity in their cognitive styles as they are
presently measured, and that in fact the term "cognitive
style" may be misleading in its implications of unity and
consistency.

Future efforts to investigate the relationship

between laterality and cognitive style might best begin with
refinement of assessment techniques in both domains.

APPENDICES
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Appendix A.

The LEM Questionnaire

LEM Introduction
"I'm going to ask you some questions, and I want you
to consider your answers carefully."
LEM Questions1
0
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1.

Envision the keyboard of a typewriter.
of the keyboard is the letter "P"?

In which corner

2.

Tell me how

3.

What is meant by the proverb, "One
tomorrows? "

4.

Visualize and describe the most upsetting photograph of
the Vietnam war that you have seen.

5.

What is the primary difference between the meanings of
the words "mischief" and "malice"?

6.

Make up a sentence using the words "code" and "mathe
matics ."

7.

If you were crossing a street from west to east, and a
car coming from the south smashed into you, which leg
would be shattered first?

8.

Imagine a rectangle. Draw a line from the upper left
hand corner to the lower right hand corner. What two
figures do you now have?

9.

Imagine that you are relaxing in hot sulfur baths looking
westward over the Pacific Ocean in California on a clear,
sunny day. Your friend is peacefully resting with his
back toward your right side. Approximately what direction is
your friend looking out over?

you feel when you are anxious.
today is worth two

10. Visualize the Prudential Tower in Boston and the United
Nations building in New York and tell me which one is
taller.
11. Make up a sentence using the words "shock" and sadness."
12. What is the primary difference between the meanings of
the words "recognize" and "remember"?
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13. For you, is anger or hate a stronger emotion?
14. Envision walking through your house or apartment and
tell me how many doors there are.
15. Picture the last automobile accident that you have seen.
In which direction were the cars going?
16. Do you use the word "logical" or "rational" more often?
17. What is meant by the proverb, "The more cost, the more
honor?"
18. When you visualize your father's face, what emotion
first strikes you?
19. On the face of a quarter, does the face of George Washing
ton look to the left or right?
20. Tell me how you feel when you are frustrated.

Appendix B.

The Object Sort Test

Below you will find a list of the names of 50 common ob
jects. Your task is to PUT TOGETHER INTO GROUPS THE OBJECTS
WHICH SEEM TO YOU TO BELONG TOGETHER. In the space below
(and continued on the back of this page if necessary), write
down the list of objects in each group, LABELING each group
with a name or phrase which describes the way in which they
belong together. Use each object only once; that is, do not
place any single object in more than one group.
YOU MAY CREATE AS MANY OR AS FEW GROUPS as you like, and
you may have as many or as few objects in a group as you
like, as long as the objects in each group belong together
for a particular reason. If, after you have thought about
all the objects, a few do not seem to belong with any of the
others, you may put those objects into groups by themselves.
PLEASE SORT ALL THE OBJECTS.
Sandpaper
Bicycle bell
Thimble
Pebble
Sugar cube
Spoon
Comb
Toy hammer
Bow tie
Sponge
Crayon
Bar of soap
Light bulb
Lipstick
Dime
Fork
Button

Cigarette
Doll
Padlock/Key
Medicine dropper
Picture postcard
Paper clip
Cologne
Ping pong ball
White chalk
Fishing fly
Hairpin
Nail
Postage stamp
Candle
Lollipop
Earring
Screwdriver

Suntan oil
Deck of cards
Wrench
Cigar
Paperback book
Penny
Sunglasses
Butter knife
Hairbrush
Golf ball
Spool of thread
Pocket knife
Vitamin pill
Typewriter ribbon
Watercolor set
Pencil
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Appendix C.

Stroop Test Directions

(Words, Page 1)

"This is a test of how fast you can read
the words on this page. After I say begin,
you are to read down the columns, starting
with the first column, reading the words
OUT LOUD as quickly as you can. After you
finish the first column, go on to the next
and so on until you reach the end. If you
make a mistake, correct it and go on. Any
questions? Then begin."

(Colors, Page 2)

(Same as above, except say "colors of the
ink" instead of "words".)

(Colors-Words,
Page 3)

"This is a test of how fast you can read
the colors of the ink on this page, ignoring
the words that are spelled. Remember to
read the colors OUT LOUD, and read the
columns as quickly as you can. Again, if
you make a mistake, correct it and go on.
Ready? Begin."

Appendix D.

The Vocabulary Test

"Please write a brief but complete definition of the following
words. If you do not know a word, you may skip the item,
although you are encouraged to attempt all the items (there
is no penalty for guessing). Please do not write in the
column marked 1X 1."
[Words presented are Items 4-40 of the WAIS Vocabulary sub
test. In scoring, full credit is assumed for Items 1-3.]
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Appendix E.

Mooney Test Directions and Answer Format

The figures you are about to see are all human faces, and
they are all right side up. The numbered items below refer
to the numbers of the figures in the accompanying booklet.
Your task is to describe the face by placing an (x) next to
the most correct word in each of the following categories:
SEX (Male, Female), AGE (Child, Adult, Aged), and DIRECTION
FACING (e.g., left, right, up, down, etc.). Rate the direc
tion facing according to your own perspective— your right or
left, etc.--and not according to the perspective of the face
in the picture.
If you are unable to see a figure within a few seconds, skip
it and return to it later.
[The answer sheet is of the following form, for the series
of 24 test stimuli presented separately in a booklet:]
AGE

SEX

DIRECTION FACING

1.

M
F

Child
Adul t
Aged

Right
Straight out
Up

2.

M
F

Child
Adult
Ag ed

Left
Up
Rig ht

[items are counted correct only if the sex, age, and direction
facing choices are correct.]
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